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# PERSONAL IMMORTALITY

BY

*August*  
*ard*  
Rev. A. K. REISCHAUER, M.A.

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## P R E F A C E .

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This little volume is written primarily for Japanese students, though it is hoped that it may also prove helpful to others. The author has found through his conversations with students that the subject of Immortality never fails to interest, but that as a result of centuries of Buddhistic philosophy which has always been more or less against Personal Immortality, the hope for a personal existence beyond the grave is very weak indeed. The star of immortality is still further beclouded for the Japanese student of to-day by the fact that there is a general impression abroad that Western Science and Western Philosophy have in one way and another made Personal Immortality a rather untenable position. The writer has tried to help the serious minded overcome this difficulty, not by denying that there is much in some schools of modern thought against Personal Immortality, but by showing that the fundamentals of modern thought, when fully understood, and especially the experience of the Christian World carefully interpreted, lead to a position which makes Personal Immortality not only possible, but makes it the most rational answer that can be given to the great question, "If a man die, shall he live again?"

It goes, of course, without saying that when one confines oneself to such a short presentation of this great subject, not more than an outline need be expected, and that many points touched upon need further elaboration; but it is hoped that this little volume may at least indicate along what lines a thoughtful student may find the way that will lead to a better understanding of the nature of the spiritual self which when once understood will be seen to belong to that which abides the wreck of time. If this volume does nothing more than to set others to thinking on this great subject, it will have accomplished its purpose; for the writer is confident that he who once begins to think seriously along the lines indicated in the following pages will not stop until he has reached the point from where he may see not only that Personal Immortality is possible, but also the Way that leads to "Life Eternal."

The author is indebted to many writers on this subject and especially to writers on the general problems of Philosophy with which this one is closely connected. Only a few of these are named; for while great names carry much weight, it is the truth as truth and not as reported to be held by another that should carry conviction to the sincere seeker.

Meiji Gakuin, Tokyo,  
March 10/10.

A. K. REISCHAUER.



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## INTRODUCTION.

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“The immortality of the soul is a matter that concerns us so much, that affects us so deeply, that we must have lost all sentiment if its investigation leaves us indifferent. All our actions and thoughts follow paths so different, varying according to the hope of gaining eternal blessing or not, that it is impossible to take any sensible or judicious step without regulating it from this standpoint which must be our final object.”

PASCAL.



These words of Pascal would seem to the average modern mind to be an overstatement of the case ; for few men can be said always to weigh their deeds and thoughts from this high plain. On the other hand, every man does at times rise to the height where he views himself from the standpoint of eternity, and the answer he will make to the question as to his destiny will necessarily more or less determine, if not consciously, at least unconsciously,

the whole tenor of his daily life. With rational beings beliefs must determine conduct, and certainly this must hold good in regard to beliefs concerning the destiny of humanity and human individuals. The subject of immortality, instead of being impractical and fit only for the idle dreamer, is therefore of the highest practical value to determine the character of man's life from day to day. Christian workers are making a mistake in neglecting the subject so much and in confining their thoughts so exclusively to immediate issues. Not that we would bring back the days when thoughts about Heaven and Hell held the field to the exclusion of daily issues, but we wish to point out that every effort to improve the condition of man's present life must flow from a profound appreciation of the real value of the life of the individual; and this is impossible unless we look at it from the standpoint of eternity. Only those who appreciate the immortal value of human life will find inspiration sufficient to work with zeal for the betterment of present conditions. Yes, the answer to the question as to the destiny of human life determines in a large measure the whole civilization of a nation.

The truth of the last statement is demonstrated on a grand scale by the great underlying difference between Oriental and Occidental civilization. It is often asked, why is it that the Oriental nations have



on the whole been considered the non-progressive nations of the world, and why have they in our day found it necessary to learn from the western nations? In the last analysis, we think, it will be found that the difference between the two civilizations is due in a large measure to the difference in their beliefs in regard to human life and its destiny. On the whole the East has ever been dominated by the conviction of the vanity of human life. It has always held that life is evil and is doomed to eternal suffering, and that the only way out of this existence of suffering is a cessation of personal conscious existence. To try to overcome and master the evils of existence is held to be vain. The truly wise man must learn to kill his desires and so destroy the real root of all suffering. There have been some noble protests in the East against this deadening philosophy and these, together with the natural instinct for self preservation, have kept this theory of man's destiny from being carried fully into practice. Especially in Japan do we find that this theory of human destiny has never found whole hearted allegiance; and so we have the popular Jodo sects of Buddhism, which are on the whole Japanese products, proclaim a rather optimistic theory of life beyond the grave through the mercies of Amida. But when we take the Orient as a whole, we find that these Japanese sects are but the excep-

tion that proves the rule. Oriental philosophy *is* at bottom pessimistic, and <sup>with</sup>pessimism is a philosophy of defeat. It makes all striving for mastery over the world worthless because man is doomed to "the dread cycle of birth and death, birth and death" ad infinitum, whence there is no escape except through absorption in the Great All, where all conscious existence of the individual is lost. It is this theory of human destiny that has made Oriental races so indifferent to life, and that has kept them from even trying to master the world that surrounds life.

On the other hand, the main spring of western progress and success in enriching human life is the conviction which has on the whole dominated Occidental thought, especially since the time of Christ, namely, the conviction of the value of the individual and the possibility of the enrichment and development of human personality, which enriched personality is destined to share an eternal happy existence. The West has ever believed that we live in a world where it is possible to "achieve universally valid satisfactions of the human personality,"<sup>1</sup> and where these achieved satisfactions shall be conserved. This optimistic theory concerning human destiny, we maintain, explains in a large measure the success which the West

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1 Foster, *The Function of Religion in the Evolution of the Race*.

has had in mastering the forces of nature and so laying the foundation for a higher civilization. If we are in the grip of a relentless fate, then, of course, it is folly to strive for a better life; but if we live in a world where progress to a better life is possible and where values, when once attained, shall be conserved and made the basis of further development, then it is obvious that life takes on new meaning.

The question of human destiny, then, is as we have said, a question of the highest practical value, both for the daily life of the individual and also for the civilization of a nation. And because it is a practical subject it is a subject that never loses its fascination for thoughtful men. If it is neglected for a while, it is sure to come to the front again. Like a spiral, it appears, disappears, and then appears again. In general it is the same from age to age though every time it comes to the front, it comes with a slight difference; the difference being due largely to whatever "Weltanschauung" holds the field at the time. For it is self evident that a scientific answer to the problem of immortality depends in the last analysis upon the particular theory of the universe one holds. A discussion of this problem, therefore, should properly come at the end of a discussion of the general problems of philosophy. This, however, would take us too far afield for our present purpose and we shall

have to content ourselves with giving, as we advance with the discussion, only the barest outline of the "Weltanschauung" upon which a belief in immortality can rest. Another reason for not stating first our philosophic presuppositions is the fact that certain aspects of the problem of immortality effect vitally our "Weltanschauung"; for the answers to the questions of what man really is and what are his needs for the future are after all the chief ones that will answer for us what the universe itself is.



The plan of this volume may be seen from the page of contents. Chapter I deals with the problem of the Possibility of Immortality and with two main objections to the doctrine. Chapter II deals with what we consider the strongest reasons for belief in immortality, which reasons do not assume, as such, any definite theory of the ultimate, though the facts discussed may be the very facts that supply us with sufficient data for an intelligent theory of the nature of the Ultimate. In Chapter III we state briefly what we consider the most satisfactory theory of the nature of the Ultimate and then give two arguments for immortality which assume this theory. Then in the last chapter we discuss very briefly the nature of im-



mortality and the way to an immortality of happiness, or the way to Life Eternal.

The arguments are not arranged in a climactic order of importance. The arrangement is due rather to the inner connection of the arguments. The Metaphysical Argument, for example, comes first in Chapter II because of its close connection with what is said in Chapter I which deals with objections. Some arguments given are really the same at bottom as others. They are given under separate names because they approach the matter from a slightly different angle and so make it more easy to bring out all phases of the particular argument. To get, then, the full force of what is said in these pages, the arguments should be taken together like the strands of a cable. Any argument is, of course, as strong only as its weakest point; but the argument for immortality is stronger than the strength of any one argument. It is as strong as the combined strength of all arguments. This is so because the arguments for immortality deal not simply with a few specific phenomena, but rather with the broad data of philosophy. If, then, we should find one or a few particular phenomena tell against immortality, we need not surrender our belief in it any more than our opponent need surrender his position if one point tells against him. But if we find a number of lines of thought, starting from different

points, converging on the same point, then we have good and sufficient reason to take the position well established. This is just what seems to be the case with the various arguments for immortality. They start from different well known facts and lead more or less definitely to a common center. That is why we said the arguments must be regarded as the strands of a cable rather than as links in a chain, if they would be fairly understood.



There remains but one more thing to be said here and perhaps it should have been said first, namely, the meaning with which we use the term immortality. We use the term in the sense of a *continued conscious existence of the individual* beyond what we ordinarily call death, or in the sense of what is called *personal immortality*.



## I.

THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMORTALITY AND  
TWO MAIN OBJECTIONS.

## 1. INTRODUCTORY.

Before entering upon a presentation of the arguments for a belief in immortality, it is worth our while to look first at a few of the most serious objections to the belief, and to consider the question of the *possibility* of a continued conscious existence after death. If it can be shown that such an existence is impossible and that it is contrary to reason to expect man to live after the body has been dissolved into its original elements, then, of course, there is little room for further discussion.

That immortality is impossible and contrary to reason, or even contrary to the fundamental theories of modern science, no one of any reputation will maintain. It is rather that a number of scientists of the present day say that we have no scientific data for a belief in immortality, and so the scientific attitude must be one of scepticism. This scepticism, however,

frequently has the effect of a positive denial of the possibility of immortality. This result is brought about by the fact that "books of a popular nature are constantly appearing which change the results of speculation into established facts and their readers naturally credit the most astounding statements."<sup>1</sup> In some quarters it is, therefore, easy to find those who have dismissed this great subject as closed from further consideration. It is looked upon as one of those many fond dreams of our fathers which have evaporated in the bright light of present day science.

When we ask this class of thinkers for the reason of the faith that is in them, for unbelief to justify itself must be a belief, we find that the objections generally fall into two classes. The first, and by far the most frequent class of objections, grows out of a materialistic bent of mind; the other class comes from those who have a more or less pantheistic conception of the universe. Why two modes of thought commonly considered the antipodes of philosophical systems should agree in their objection to this great belief of the human race, may at first seem surprising. Any one, however, conversant with modern thought knows that Speculative Materialism and the Newer Pantheism are two extremes that really meet. A

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1. Hibbert Journal, July 1909, p. 880.



materialism, which is so refined as to make the essence of matter pure force<sup>1</sup> and which is so shallow in its observations as to say that there is really no difference between mechanical force and psychic force, can easily shake hands with the Newer Pantheism, which conceives the universe as being at bottom a great unconscious force and, like materialism, practically ignoring the difference between mechanical force and psychic force.<sup>2</sup> Both use terms sufficiently vague to cover a multitude of inconsistencies. Both, when pressed, end in a barren monism, which blots out all distinctions which we must observe if we would not be blind to half of existence; distinctions, too, which materialists and pantheists *do* observe in their daily life, and so give the lie to their philosophic systems.

In modern thought the terms Materialism and Pantheism do not appear so frequently, but instead we have such terms as Naturalism and Monism. But in as much as these terms are really very vague in meaning, we prefer to use the older terms. Na-

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1. When Leibnitz said that the essence of matter is force, he uttered a great truth; but he did not thereby get rid of "extension" as a property of matter. And when modern scientists speak of "ions," "electrons," etc, they cannot get rid of the truth contained in the older atomic theories.

2. To be sure, we may speak of matter in terms of force and we may call psychical phenomena a force; but when we have applied the same term to both we do not make them the same.

turalism and Monism may both be either materialistic or spiritualistic, and so the terms only confuse thought.

Materialism and Pantheism, then, whether formulated as philosophic systems or held in a vague way, are now, as always, the Scylla and Charybdis of the doctrine of immortality; and to be wrecked on one is little different from being wrecked on the other. Neither theory affirms the passing into nothingness of man at death. The one says that he returns to the dust whence he was taken; the other, that he is absorbed and lost in the great essence, the great unconscious power or spirit of which he is a part. Both, therefore, deny the possibility of a continued conscious existence of the individual beyond the grave.

Were all leaders in philosophic thought wedded to one or the other of these two schools, it would, indeed, be a bold task on the part of the author to make a plea for another position, or rather, to discuss the problem of immortality from a standpoint other than and opposed to these two. As a matter of fact this is not the case. Though materialism and pantheism have always had many followers, the leaders of thought at least in the West, are, as a rule, not among the ranks of either school. Says Weber, "Take note of this fact! With a few rare exceptions the leaders of European philosophy are not to be found among the pure materialists or in the camp

of the spiritualists; we must look for them between the two camps."<sup>1</sup> That is, a barren Monism, whether materialistic or spiritualistic, cannot satisfy the modern mind.

What that intermediary position is, we cannot stop here to develop in full. It is enough to say that it recognizes two outstanding facts. The one is that the sciences and experience find the world pluralistic,—at least, dualistic. The other is that the human mind seems to be imperious in its demands to reduce the world to a One,—at least, a unity of some sort. Experience seems to point one way, and instinct, apparently, another. The most successful attempt to reconcile these two extremes is the theory of Noetic Unity. The universe, this theory asserts, is a rational unity. That is, it is a knowable oneness. Not that any one man can understand all its secrets, nor show how it is genetically one, but that the universe is so ordered that it responds to reason. Every thing seems to be controlled by rational laws, and since controlled by rational laws, it is reasonable to say that it is the expression of a superintending Intelligence in whose image man is made.<sup>2</sup> This position is

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1. History of Philosophy. English translation. p. 597.

2. We shall refer to this point again in Chapter III and make more clear what we mean.

neither the old dualistic position, nor is it a barren spiritual monism that ignores the difference between material and spiritual phenomena. It simply asserts that the spiritual self is the starting point of all knowledge, and that there is some chance of understanding, practically at least, the unity, activity, and regularity that nature presents in terms of this spiritual self, whereas the opposite course would be impossible. "This is the imperishable merit and message of the Kantian Epistemology—with Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, as forerunner, since he proclaimed the thinking self as the fixed point over against all doubt, and especially as the starting point for the construction of our world. To begin with the subject; not to pass from the world to man, but from the man to the world; to transfer the center of gravity from the object to the subject—this is characteristic of that mode of thought which conserves our values. And Kant is the master of them who know from this standpoint..... The world is more than nature, and we do not experience spirit from the standpoint of nature, but nature from the standpoint of spirit."<sup>1</sup> The spiritual self, then, being the starting point of all knowledge, must be a primary reality beyond which we cannot go. It is the mea-

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1. Foster. The Finality of the Christian Religion. pp. 225, 227.



sure of all reality, and to reduce it to something less than itself would be to destroy all knowledge. For if the knowing self is at bottom less than a knowing reality, it is obvious that all knowledge of any reality is impossible. In answer, then, to the question how this apparently pluralistic universe is a One, this theory simply asserts that the ultimate, though not fully known to us, cannot be conceived of in terms less than our spiritual self.

Not to go any further into this point here ; it is enough to remember that most leaders in European philosophy hold a view of the universe which makes a belief in a conscious existence of the individual beyond the grave not only a *possibility*, but even a *probability*. The degree of probability will be seen from the arguments we shall present.

Having said the above in general with reference to the views of the materialist and pantheist in regard to the problem of immortality, let us consider the objections which come from these two quarters more closely. First let us take the objection from the materialistic mode of thought.

## 2. OBJECTION FROM MATERIALISM.

The most serious objection from the side of materialism, briefly stated, is as follows. Psychical pheno-

mena, as we know them, are always associated with some physical organism. Some physiological psychologists even make the claim that they can show that this connection is so close that the slightest psychical phenomenon has its corresponding phenomenon in the brain. The inference then is drawn that the physical phenomenon in the brain conditions the psychical one, or that the former may even be the cause of the latter. Now if the brain motion conditions the psychical state, and especially if it is the real cause of the psychical state, then psychical states are impossible apart from the physical organism. What we call the spirit of man, then, depends for its existence upon the physical organism called the brain. And if that is the case, then, of course, when this physical organism is dissolved, as it is after death, psychical states are now longer possible, and the mind, or spirit, ceases to be.

This theory of the modern materialist is by no means new. It is essentially the conception some Pythagorians of old held, who said that the soul is but the resultant of the bodily functions. Both in its ancient and in its modern forms, has the theory been ably refuted. So thoroughly has it been refuted that some of the leaders in present day philosophy speak of materialism as being childish ; and that it deserves attention only because the masses are even to-day

childish in their power of comprehending metaphysical problems.<sup>1</sup> It would be sufficient at this point to refer the reader to some of the more able refutations of the materialistic positions. As this, however, would be asking too much and as it is better to do one's own thinking, let us briefly examine the above theory as to what is the real essence of the human soul, and this objection to a belief in a future conscious existence of the individual.

When it is said that we know psychological phenomena now only as they are associated with some physical organism, we may give our assent, though we must not necessarily conclude that psychological phenomena apart from a physical organism are impossible. In fact, we have no right whatever to draw this conclusion, for that would be nothing more than an argument from ignorance. No one would quarrel with us on this point, so let us

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1. Speaking of Haeckel and the leaders in materialism, Prof. N. Weinl says. "They are no longer the leaders of the generation which lives and works." Then again, speaking of the failure of science to satisfy the demands of the modern mind by giving a materialistic interpretation, he says, "She knows that the pretence of solving the 'World-riddle' (Haeckel) by her means alone is a mere echo of youthful enthusiasm; and only our half-educated public, which founded the 'League of Monists' (materialistic monism) two years ago, now listen to cant of this kind." *Hilbert Journal*, July. pp. 722, 723.

come to the second, namely, that there seems to be a close connection between the psychical phenomena that we know and the physical organism with which they are associated. We all admit in general that there seems to be a close connection between a man's body and what we call his spirit. It would be madness to deny this. But what is this connection? How does one affect the other? Is the relation between the two such that we can call the one the cause and the other the effect? And if that is so, which is the cause and which is the effect? Or better, which is the more ultimate reality, the brain particle in motion or that reality which we call the spirit, which alone knows motion? Or is there a connection without the one being the absolute cause of the other? These are questions not so easily answered, and all we wish to show here is that the answer which materialism makes cannot possibly be the correct one. In fact, we think we can show that materialism's answer refutes itself.

But to come back to the starting point of certain physiological psychologists who say that for every psychical state there is a corresponding physical state in the brain. To begin with, this is claiming more than the majority of psychologists are willing to admit. No less an authority than Wundt calls a halt and points out that this is a gratuitous assumption.

And even if it could be demonstrated that for every psychical state there is a concomitant motion in the brain, this would no more prove that the brain motion causes the psychical state than that the psychical state causes the brain motion. In other words, it would not at all answer the question which of the two represents the more ultimate reality. Most psychologists recognize this fact, and in consequence the theory known as the Parallelism Theory has been advanced. This theory holds that there is a correspondence between the psychical states and the physical phenomena in the brain without the one being the real cause of the other. Says Professor Hoeffding. "In psychical and physiological phenomena we have two serial forms of states, which experience shows us to vary in certain reciprocal relations, without it's being possible to deduce the existence of the one series from the existence of the other series. Scientifically considered, the task now is, to conceive each of the two series by *itself as completely* and continuously as possible and to show which definite members of the one series correspond to certain members of the other series."<sup>1</sup> So necessary according to him—and we feel the force of it—is it to avoid the inference that the brain state passes into the psychical state, as cause

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1. The Problems of Philosophy. p. 47.



passes into effect, that he says further, "The principle of continuity,—and with it the hypothesis of identity—would be refuted, if it could be proved that the energy contained in a brain state stood in no relation of equivalence to *the preceeding and succeeding states* in the brain in the organism, and in the physical environment."<sup>1</sup>

Not only is it impossible to hold that physiological states pass into psychical states as cause passes into effect, it seems impossible to hold even to a theory of strict parallelism. That is, Hoeffding agrees essentially with Wundt that it seems unwarranted even to assert that for every physical phenomena in the brain there is a corresponding psychical state, and *vice versa*. He says further, "This much appears to be clear,—that the closer one comes to the problem in real life, the more exceedingly difficult it becomes to find the members in the two series of phenomena which can be pointed out as corresponding.....Even if one lays adequate emphasis on the continuity element both in the psychological and physiological realm, yet it will prove difficult to break the two series up into members that will stand out with such individuality that a true comparison can be instituted. Whichever hypothesis we build on, we must be prepared to find

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1. The Problems of Philosophy. p. 49.

that the very members of the two series which are considered to correspond will exhibit differences which cannot be derived from the one or the other member *by itself alone*. It might, therefore, be altogether possible that 'different' psychical phenomena would correspond to the 'same' physiological state (or vice versa) as sometimes one language has only a single word where another has two words."<sup>1</sup> Professor Muirhead gives a fair statement of the outcome of the investigation of this psycho-physiological problem when he says, "The general result of the analysis now generally accepted in Psychology is the vindication for the mind of a reality of its own independent of the physical order."

From what we have said, then, this much is clear,—that though in general there is some connection between physiological and psychical states, it cannot be shown that there is an exact correspondence between the two; and further, it is absolutely unwarranted to draw the conclusion that brain motion is the real cause of psychical phenomena. And since this is so, the materialist's objection to immortality, namely, that with the dissolution of the brain the spiritual self of man lapses into nothingness, falls to the ground.

So much in answer to materialism from the stand-

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1. The Problems of Philosophy. pp. 52, 53.

point of physiological Psychology. There are other general considerations about the nature of the spiritual self of man that cut with equal clearness against the materialistic position. These we take up next.

Any one conversant with the history of thought, and especially the history of thought in the modern period, must know that nothing is more clear than that phenomena cannot be reduced to one kind. Even the most rigid monistic systems recognize the fact that absolute monism is impossible. Spinoza, for example, who spoke of the essence of things in terms of a "One and indivisible substance," was compelled to recognize that it has two "attributes," namely, "thought and extension," which are so different that it is impossible to speak of one in terms of the other.

If the absolute idealist has failed in reducing matter and motion to pure thought, the materialist has fared even worse in his attempt to show that thought is at bottom nothing but energetic matter.<sup>1</sup> That this is a futile attempt and always will be, must be quite evident to any one who will try to picture to his imagination

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1. If Monism must be had at all cost, there is some chance of showing the tenability of a kind of spiritual Monism. For "it is only in terms of mind that we can understand the unity, activity, and regularity that nature presents. In so understanding we see that nature is spirit." Ward. Naturalism and Agnosticism.

what is implied in such an assertion. Motion, however refined the matter is that does the moving, is not thought. Even if you reduce all motion to "electrons," "ions," and "force centers," or whatever you wish to call the ultimate that makes up the atoms of the physical world, you are not one step nearer bridging the chasm between what we call thought and these *other things* that ever remain nothing more than the *objects* of thought. It is true that some of our thoughts seem to be started by physical realities, and to the careless thinker it might seem that thought is nothing but the result of these physical realities. To illustrate; I am sitting by my open window and looking out indifferently. Suddenly my eye falls upon an object and in ordinary parlance I say that I notice a bird sitting on the branch of a neighboring tree. When I say, I see a bird, what has happened? Scientists will tell me that light waves striking the bird are reflected to my eye. In some mysterious way the eye conveys the motion from these light waves through the optic nerve to the brain. In the brain a certain number of the myriad particles that constitute it are set into motion and these set others into motion, and then—what? Well, we do not know how, but in some mysterious way thought is the result and I am conscious of the bird on the neighboring tree. We started with the bird and

ended with a thought. The bird was a physical object ; the light waves are ether in motion, or electromagnetic waves—whatever that may mean ; the nerve vibrations which connect the eye with the brain are physical realities ; the brain particles moving are physical realities ; but *moving matter*, however refined the matter that does the moving, is not the same as the thought of which the moving matter is but the object.

If even in sense perception, as illustrated by the above case, mental process cannot be reduced to a mere mechanical motion, what will the materialist say in explanation of pure mental processes where the mind is engaged in what we might call creative effort ? To give but one illustration of such a process : Again I am sitting by an open window with a blank tablet before me and a pen in hand. I am writing a letter to my mother who happens to be some seven thousand miles away. I am writing page after page, and the object of my thought is no physical reality near me. I am writing to her about herself, and not even about her physical self, but about her love and goodness,—realities which, to begin with, are not physical. Now the question that arises is this ; if thought is at bottom nothing but brain motion, what in the above case caused my brain to move in such a way that the symbols which I have put on



paper express my devotion to my mother for her love and goodness? My pen moves on and on, and blue lines on white paper are the result. The energy that my hand expends in tracing these lines could be measured and expressed in terms of mechanical motion. But what reality makes my pen move in a way so as to express thought? Trace it back to the most refined particles that make up my brain, the question still arises, *what* made that first particle move in such a way that the next one moved in such a way and so on and on that the result is a rational result? Surely we cannot say that the first particle in the process just happened to move so, and the rational result expressed in my letter to my mother is a pure accident. Surely, it must be self evident that in this case and, in fact, in all cases where thought is the result, we are dealing with a reality quite different from the materialist's matter and motion, which in themselves can never be anything more than the *object* of thought. They are, as Kant said, the raw symbols of thought, but not thought itself. These raw symbols have to be laid hold on by another reality, namely the spiritual self, before thought can be the result. If materialism were true, thought would be impossible, truth would be the same as falsehood. For truth equals thought, and falsehood equals thought; and if thought equals matter in motion, then truth equals falsehood;

for things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. When, then, a materialist says to me, believe me, thought equals matter in motion, I reply. Why believe you? According to your hypothesis, to believe you would be the same as not believing you. Both equal thought, and thought equals matter in motion. And why should one motion be better than another? As we said above, materialism when pressed to its logical conclusion refutes itself. Even materialists occasionally recognize this in their sober moments. Take, for example, the philosopher Hobbes, whose thinking tended decidedly towards materialism. He came to a halt, however, before the consideration "that among all phenomena the most important is just this, that something can be a phenomena to us at all." It is, as Professor Hoeffding says. "The materialist will always be shipwrecked either by the impossibility of tracing back the psychical to the material, or by the epistemological reflection that we .....have matter only as the *object* of consciousness, and that if materialism were true, nothing could exist to *which* the material object or phenomena could be presented."

Then again, if mind or spirit is but the resultant of brain matter in motion, we ask, of what "brain matter in motion" is my mind the resultant? When I examine my own psychic state, I am conscious of

what we call *the self*. That is, I have the power of self consciousness. In self consciousness two things stand out clearly. One is *identity* and the other is *unity*. In self consciousness, which is of all knowledge most immediate and authoritative, I know myself to be the *same I* from time to time, and I know myself to be a unity; in fact, this consciousness of unity furnishes the measure for all other unities. But to take up in the order named these two factors which are present in the act of self consciousness.

*Identity.* I know myself to be the same from time to time. However varied my psychic life may be, I always know it as *my* psychic life. I may hate intensely at one time, and love with equal intensity at another. I may feel the sense of fear at one moment, and at another be perfectly at ease and confident that no changes can befall me. I may be utterly disgusted at one time, and perfectly delighted and pleased at another; or again, hopelessly disappointed at one time, and at another time "hoping all things." In all these different states I know myself to be the *same I*. To deny that the ego is the same from time to time is to deny the very possibility of knowledge. For if I am not certain that the *I* that draws the conclusion in a logical process is the *same I* which formulates the premis, then it is obvious that my conclusion has no

value. Now if mind is but the resultant of matter in motion, how arises the consciousness of identity that we have in self-consciousness? For it must be remembered that brain material is constantly changing. We are told by science that the material of our brain is always changing. It changes completely every few years, and some of it every few months. My brain to-day is not at all the same that began work on these pages. The brain, in short, is nothing but a flux of atoms; but how can a *flux* of atoms produce the psychical state in which the ego knows itself to be the *same* as in a previous state? The ego knows itself to the *same* from time to time, and also knows that the brain matter, which the materialist considers the cause of the ego to be *different* from time to time.

Not only so, but the whole field of memory, that is, the psychic states which are a repetition of former psychic states would be impossible on the materialist's hypothesis. If thought is but matter in motion, how can this moving matter reproduce a mental image years after the matter itself has disappeared? To illustrate; in 1899 the writer had a certain friend in college. In the intercourse with this companion from day to day many things transpired,—some of importance, some trivial. Some of the important ones were, perhaps, frequently thought of afterwards, the

trivial ones were forgotten, as we say. In 1909 this friend came to visit me in Tokyo. Ten years had elapsed and the place of meeting was seven thousand miles distant from the place we had last met. What is more, the body my friend had in 1909 was entirely different from the one he had in 1899. He had been five years in the Philippines, and the matter that constituted his body was all accumulated in those southern islands. The same was true of my body. I had been four years in Tokyo and my body was practically "Japanese" in its make-up. The two physical realities that confronted each other at this meeting in 1909 were not identical with the two physical realities that parted in 1899. If matter constitutes the deepest reality of man, I repeat, then the two physical realities, or metaphysical realities, that confronted each other at this meeting were not identical with those two that separated in 1899. And yet, when we met, we *knew* each other. We talked of by-gone days, and we thought of things,—some of them trivial things,—which we had not thought of during these ten years. When I say "we knew each other," what were the realities that knew each other? The general appearance, that is, the forms of the respective bodies in 1899 and 1909 were the same; but are forms realities apart from the content? What, I ask, were the realities that knew each other in 1909, and that knew



each other to be the *same* as in 1899, when the physical realities that constituted our bodies in 1899 had in the meantime been gradually scattered over this globe between America and the Philippine Islands? Identity of man, it would seem, is something far deeper than the sameness of matter that makes up his physical organism. We recognize this in every day life. Take the case of the criminal punished ten years after the crime was committed. The body that is imprisoned is not the same reality as the body that committed the crime. But the man, we say, is the *same man* : and we are right.

The materialist might reply : True, the matter that constitutes the body is always changing, but the same kind of matter always replaces it, and so, though there is no *identity* of matter, there is, at least, the same kind of matter. Even so, but the matter that constitutes the body of perfect strangers is of the *same kind*, and yet there is no recognition of each other. It is even conceivable that in the course of ten years the matter that made up the bodies of two friends A and B might constitute in part the bodies of two others. C and D, and yet C and D be perfect strangers. That is, the atoms that knew each other when they constituted the bodies of A and B, did not know each other when they entered the bodies of C and D ; and yet A and B, who were friends in 1899, recognized

each other ten years later. How can all this be, if the atoms,—or whatever you wish to call them,—that make up our physical organism are the ultimate realities? How does the matter which departs communicate to that which follows the reality that makes memory possible, and that gives rise to a consciousness of identity which we find in self consciousness? Even if the departing particles of brain matter communicate something to their successors, this *something* is a reality other than the flux of atoms that make up the brain. And so the materialist is no better off than he was before. He has in his own consciousness knowledge of a reality which is deeper than the atoms that make up his brain. Without this deeper reality which we call the spiritual self, it would be impossible to make the assertion that brain matter is a flux; for unless a *something* remains that is above and independent of this flux of atoms, how could the observation be made? We are reduced again to Hobbes' profound remark that the most important of all phenomena is just this that something can be a phenomenon at all.

But there is a second factor present in self consciousness besides identity, namely, the consciousness of a unity,—a oneness. Man does not only know himself to be the *same* in the midst of his varied experiences, but he also knows himself to be a unity.

When I say "I," or "I am," or "I do this and that," the *I* stands for a oneness, a unity of the highest order. Nothing known to man is a oneness or a unity in as full a sense as the *I* knows itself to be a oneness in the act of self consciousness. This cannot be demonstrated, but to every one who reflects for a moment on what is present to the mind in self consciousness it must be clear that the *I* or the *ego* is that by which the "plurality of psychical experiences is comprehended into a *unity of consciousness* in a manner not further definable."<sup>1</sup> Now the question that arises is this: If the myriad of atoms that constitute the brain are the ultimate realities of the self, how arises this consciousness of unity? How arises the consciousness of a oneness in the midst of these millions of whirling atoms,—atoms, too, that are ever being replaced by other atoms? There is no other answer but that the consciousness of unity arises from a reality far deeper and more permanent than these myriad of atoms that are in a constant flux.

From all these considerations it seems clear that the materialist's theory of the nature of the spiritual self of man is utterly inadequate. His objection, then, to a belief in a conscious personal existence after death on the ground that at death the physical organism is dis-

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1. Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy. p. 129.

solved, falls to the ground. A final question may be raised here by the materialist and that is this : If the spiritual self is not the resultant of the physical organism, and if it can exist independently of it, what is the need of the physical organism at all? It may be difficult to give an adequate answer to this, and yet we venture to suggest, at least, the line of thought along which the answer lies.

First, let us suggest it by analogy. Many things in this world of ours are of the nature of means or instruments. The higher the form of life, the more numerous and complex are the instruments through which life expresses itself. In human life especially do we find an increasing use of things external as means for a fuller expression of the self. Compare, for example, an advanced civilization with primitive man. Primitive man had a few crooked sticks and sharp stones and these things sufficed for the time to give expression to his desires and to satisfy his needs. Man of to-day makes everything subserve his needs, and his desire for a fuller expression of himself has made him master over earth, sea and sky. He lives in better houses, eats better food, travels faster and more comfortably ; in short, he controls the forces of nature better and more completely than ever before in the history of the race. The question that now arises is ; do these various objects of modern, complex

civilization give rise to the modern man, or does the modern man give rise to this complex machinery of modern life? Do the *instruments* of modern life make the modern man, or does the modern *man* make the instruments? It is quite clear that there is a reciprocal relation here. But on a closer examination it will be seen that the initial force in a progressive civilization is the man, and not the things which he produces.

Let us carry this a step further. Man uses the world without, which is not a real part of himself, as a means to give expression to his desires and to realize himself more fully. Is not the human body itself but a means of self realization,—an instrument through which the ego gives expression to itself, without being dependent on the body for its existence? And more than that, is it not an instrument that may be necessary and useful for a time for the spiritual self to operate upon its present environment but which some day may be discarded and replaced by a higher and nobler instrument suited to its new environment? It is certainly far more reasonable to look upon the body as an instrument of the spiritual self rather than to regard it as the primary reality which gives rise to the spiritual self.

But there is another reason for considering the body but as a means or instrument of the spiritual self rather than as the cause of the spiritual self, and that



is the modern biological theory of the relation between organism and function. The old and rather materialistic theory was that organism preceeds function. Complex organisation gives rise, it was held, to complex function. The more highly the body is organised, the more varied and superior is the life represented by this organism. An amoeba, for example, lives a very simple life because it has a simple organism. The vertebrates live the most varied and complex life because of their complex organism. Man is superior to other living things because of the superiority of his complex organism. He has an excellent eye with which to see, an excellent ear with which to hear, his hands are wonderfully adapted to varied uses ; and what is more, he has an excellent brain,—very large, and highly convoluted—with which to do his thinking. The function of the eye is to see, of the ear to hear, and of the brain to think ; and the higher and more complex the organization of these organs, the better the result.

Now the old view was correct in saying that the more complex the organism, the more efficient was the result. It is even true that the more complex the convolutions of the brain, the better the thinking. But the old view was wrong in assuming too much. It never asked the question, what gives rise to the complex organism ; nor did it ask, what is cause and

what is effect? Is man, for example, a superior thinking being because he has a large and highly convoluted brain, or has he a large and highly convoluted brain because he is a superior thinking being? Or again, does the organization of matter in a plant give rise to the life of the plant and its varied functioning, or does the life principle that is embodied in the seed reach out and gather material and so build up the highly organized plant? Modern thought says just the opposite of what the old view said. Function preceeds organism. Higher organization is due to a higher life principle, and not vice versa. Especially since the days of Schopenhauer has it been recognized that there is nothing more ultimate in this universe than what he called will. By this he meant that impelling life principle which struggles for a fuller existence; and in the struggle it at times objectifies itself and so gives rise to organized matter, such as we see in plant and animal life. It is the will to be, and ever to be more and higher, that accounts for the increasing and expanding universe which modern evolutionary science exhibits this world to be. The demand of life for a fuller realization gives rise to a more perfect organism through which it can express itself. The evolutionary theory, in its modern form, is nothing but the biological application of Schopenhauer's principle. The complex organism

of the higher forms of life is the result of a striving for fuller realization and not the opposite. According to this modern view, then, the body and its complex organization does not account for its complex life, but the life principle has, according to its needs, built up this complex bodily organism through which it realizes itself most fully in this present material environment. The highly organized and convoluted brain of man, then, does not give rise to his superiority as a thinking animal; but because he is a thinking being, he has a highly organized brain through which he operates upon the physical world in which he now lives.

And now to come back again to what we said in connection with the psycho-physiological problem at the beginning of this section. We saw that a theory called Parallelism had been advanced, and that the best authorities hold this, but not in a strict sense. In short, they hold that while it seems true that for most psychical states there are corresponding physical states in the brain, yet it is also necessary to recognize the fact that *different* psychical states may have the *same* physical states, or vice versa, and also that some psychical states may have *no* corresponding physical states in the brain. This is exactly what one would expect if the brain is but the instrument through which the spiritual self operates upon a physical environment. Where the psychical state eventuates in

a physical result, as we have, for example, in the case of writing a letter ; or where the opposite takes place, as in all sense perception, we would expect psychical states and physical states to more or less correspond. But in pure reflection which does not eventuate in action we would probably have a psychical state without any corresponding physical state in the brain.

In answer, then, to materialism's last question, why the spiritual self is connected with a material body, if it is not the product of that body and if it can exist apart from it, we answer ; the most satisfactory conception of the relation between the two is that the body is of the nature of an instrument through which the spiritual self realizes itself in this physical environment.

Now since the body is not the cause of the life, much less the cause of the psychic life or the spiritual self, but rather its instrument, it is no serious objection to the belief in the continued conscious existence of the spiritual self to point out the fact that after death this instrument is dissolved. The body is rather the harp upon which mind, the master musician, plays. When the harp breaks, the music may cease, but the musician is not dead. It is reasonable to believe that in a new realm of existence he will resume his music on a more perfect instrument, if indeed he needs an

instruments at all. "As we have borne the image of the earthy, so shall we bear the image of the heavenly." "There is a natural body and there is a spiritual body." "First that which is natural then that which is spiritual." Just what the nature of the instrument, or that "image of the heavenly" will be, may be difficult to represent to the imagination; but certainly in view of the facts of the spiritual self which we have considered in these pages, no one will dogmatically assert that the *musician mind* must depend on the instrument brain; and much less, that the instrument brain is the cause and author of the musician mind.

Two points, then, seem clear. The first is that though it is true that psychical phenomena are in this life closely associated with the physical organism, still it is evident that these psychical phenomena can in no adequate sense be reduced to the physical phenomena in the brain. The second point is this. Since the spiritual self is a reality other than and independent of the physical order, it is perfectly rational to believe that it will survive the death and dissolution of the body with which it is now associated. Immortality of the spiritual self is, therefore, not only possible when examined from the view point of science, but it even seems highly probable.

### 3. OBJECTION FROM THE SIDE OF THE NEWER PANTHEISM.

There is another objection that is made to the belief in immortality which comes from what is frequently regarded as the antipode of materialism, namely, pantheism. The old pantheism, like old fashioned materialism, is dead. Even in the pantheistic Orient it would be hard to find among the educated, real old fashioned pantheists. But there is a Newer Pantheism springing up which is a rather strange mixture of Oriental and Occidental thought. Its form is Oriental; its content Occidental. In fact, its real content is in some writers so much like the materialistic Monism of the west that it is difficult to discriminate between the two.

But not to prolong these generalizations, let us come at once to the objection raised by this Newer Pantheism. In short, it reasons as follows in regard to the problem of immortality.

True, psychical phenomena are realities. Spirit, mind, soul, the ego, or whatever you wish to call it, is not only real, but it is a *primary* reality. Matter is but a manifestation of spirit, or as a recent writer puts it, "it is spirit materially expressed." Thus far, it is in harmony with spiritualism, and apparently clear cut against materialism,—especially old fashioned



materialism. But when the newer pantheism begins to discuss what is the real essence of finite spirits and their relation to the absolute, it becomes clear that it uses the vocabulary of the spiritualists in rather a materialistic sense, and that, after all, by *spirit* is meant something very little different from the *force* of the modern materialist. The spiritual self, it reasons, is a reality. All finite spirits are real because they are a real part of the ultimate,—the great All. These finite spirits have *now* the power of self consciousness. During this period in which finite spirits have the power of self consciousness they objectify themselves. In fact, the power of self consciousness seems to be the result of the physical organism which latter, however, is but a “manifestation of spirit.” In man, then, the spiritual self produces the physical self, and this latter gives the spiritual self the power of self consciousness. Or to speak in terms of the absolute: The Infinite Spirit comes into consciousness in the finite spirit, but this consciousness is of brief duration and lapses into unconsciousness at what we call death. Our spirits are, then, in reality only a part, as it were, of the Infinite Spirit, the essence of which is Unconscious Force. Or again, Unconscious Force is the essence of things. This Unconscious Force objectifies itself in what we call the material world, and in some places where it objectifies itself, for example, in man

it has the power of self consciousness, which, however, lasts only for a while and then lapses again into unconsciousness. The figure to illustrate this conception which the older pantheism frequently used and which the new pantheism has not outgrown, is the figure of the ocean and its waves. The ocean, as a whole, represents the Infinite Spirit, the waves are the finite conscious spirits. As only a part of the ocean is waves and as these waves ever sink back again into the depths of the ocean and are lost as waves, so the Infinite Spirit is conscious only in the finite and the finite ever sink back again into and are lost in the Infinite Spirit, whose essence is Unconscious Force. At death, then, man's spiritual self does not cease to exist, but it ceases to exist as a conscious spirit; just as the water in the wave does not cease to exist as water when it sinks again into the ocean, but ceases to exist as a wave. We are immortal because we are a part of reality, and reality cannot cease to be; but our immortality is not an individual conscious existence. We are lost again in the Great All whence we in a measure had come out for a brief existence of consciousness.

This position, then, is to all practical purposes the same as that of materialistic monism. Both reduce the universe to a mere Force, the former adding only the misleading term "unconscious." Both deny the

possibility of a conscious existence after death. They differ only in that materialism says outright that the essence of things is Force, and that the spiritual self of man is the resultant of "Energetic Matter"; whereas the newer pantheism starts with the term "spirit" and says that spirit objectifies itself and thus becomes conscious, as for example in man, but that the real essence of spirit is Unconscious Force. The newer pantheism, then, does not deny the reality of the spiritual self, but simply the power of consciousness of the finite spirit after death; and this denial, as we have seen, is based upon the theory that the essence of the Infinite Spirit is Unconscious Force.

The hold this newer Pantheism has on the modern mind is due largely to two things. These are its compromising position, and the vagueness of its terminology, or rather its misuse of terms. When, for example, it says that spirit is the ultimate reality, it shakes hands with the spiritualists; and even when it says that the essence of spirit is *unconscious force*, it tries to hold out the olive branch to the spiritualists, for the term "unconscious" may suggest a psychic or spiritual force. On the other hand when it reduces spirit,—the ultimate,—to force, it is not far from modern materialism which, since the days of Leibnitz, has been accustomed to think of matter in terms of force. The term "unconscious" need not perturb

the materialist, for all mechanical force is unconscious. That is, the materialist can take the term "unconscious force" to mean simply plain *force*—force that is not conscious; while the spiritualist is allowed to take it as suggesting a psychic force, and so something different from ordinary mechanical force.

The first question, then, that we must ask is; what is meant by "unconscious force" as representing the ultimate? How does it differ from mere force? If the term "force" can be applied to all phenomena, both physical and spiritual, it can be done so only because the term has a wide latitude of meaning. We have already seen in the last section that it is impossible to reduce phenomena to one term which will adequately describe them, and the newer Pantheist, with his vague terminology of "spirit whose essence is Unconscious Force," will have to face the question we have just asked. We are not satisfied with terms that squint both ways. To repeat, we ask, what does Unconscious Force mean? Does it mean a force that is not conscious and that has not the power of becoming so, as for example, all mechanical force? If it means this, then the adjective "unconscious" had better be dropped, for it only adds confusion. Spirit is, then, what the materialist says it is, a resultant of "energetic matter." But this we have shown in the last

section it cannot be, and we need not repeat the argument here.

If Unconscious Force does not mean the mechanical force of the materialist, does it mean a real spiritual force—a force that is truly a spiritual force, but that is unconscious in its real essence? Judging from the chief advocates of the newer pantheism, we are safe in saying that it means this latter. Spirit, then, is not a resultant of the force of the materialist, but its essence is a real psychic force, such as we know ourselves to be; only that the Infinite Spirit has not the power of self consciousness. To define, then, more clearly the term “unconscious force,” we would say it means a psychic force that is unconscious. Eduard von Hartman in his “Philosophy of the Unconscious” represents this position most clearly. The ultimate is spirit—an intelligent force that is unconscious. “It knows, but it does not know that it knows,” as Weber in his “History of Philosophy” puts it. This unconscious intelligent force is sometimes spoken of as “Unconscious Reason”, or simply as “Reason” or even as “the Great Unconscious”; but whatever phraseology is used, it will be seen in the last analysis that the ultimate is conceived of in terms of the spiritual self of man, with this difference that it is denied the power of consciousness, excepting as it is conscious in

the finite spirits. Or more strictly, the Infinite Spirit comes into consciousness only in the finite spirits, and this consciousness lapses again into unconsciousness at what we call death.

When the newer Pantheist, then, admits that the ultimate—the Infinite Spirit—must be conceived of in terms of man's spiritual self, and that it is an intelligent force, we have no quarrel with him. But when he says that the ultimate is conscious only in the finite spirits; and further, that the finite spirits lose the power of consciousness at what we call death, we cannot agree.

The first of these points of disagreement, namely, the conception as to the nature of the ultimate, we shall consider more fully in a later chapter. Here let us stop to consider only one main point, namely, the contents of the mental state we call self consciousness. Is it true that the ultimate is conscious or realizes itself in the self-consciousness of finite spirits? Is the conception of the pantheist that the finite spirit is but a wavelet of a moment's duration on the infinite ocean borne out by our consciousness? When I am self-conscious, I am conscious of *myself*, and the *self* of which I am conscious is not the Great All, it is not the Infinite Spirit. The Infinite Spirit is not conscious of itself in me. *I* and *only I* am conscious of myself in self-consciousness. You and only you are



conscious of yourself. The self of which I am conscious is a reality back of which I cannot go, for this thinking self is the starting point of all knowledge. To try to go beyond it and say that it is really a more ultimate reality than myself that is conscious in me is like lifting one's self by one's own boot straps. Not only am I, and not the Infinite Spirit conscious of myself in self-consciousness, but I am also conscious of what is not myself. I am conscious of what we call the *non-ego*. If it were true that the Infinite Spirit comes into consciousness in me when I am self-conscious, then we must also say that the Infinite Spirit is conscious of the "not self" when I am conscious of the "not self." But how can there be a "self" and a "not self" when all is one and the same? Consciousness of the "self" and consciousness of the "not self" would have to be identical. But this is exactly what we cannot admit. We cannot admit this because we know nothing so immediately and nothing is therefore so authoritative as that I am not the "not I." To blot out the difference between the consciousness of the self and the "not self" would be subversive to all knowledge. In self-consciousness, then, I know myself as an entity other than other "Is" and other than the "not I." This, we hold, would be impossible if my state of self-consciousness were but the Infinite Spirit becoming conscious.

Does this mean, then, that the human self is an ultimate reality that is self-existent? Not at all. We do not deny that the ultimate source of our being is the Infinite Spirit, but simply that the Infinite Spirit is conscious only in the finite. We hold that the Infinite Spirit, though imminent in the finite, at the same time transcends the finite. The figure of the ocean and the waves, as used by pantheism, is misleading. Of course, the ocean exists in the waves, and to take away one wave would be to reduce the ocean by that much. It is also true that when the wave sinks back again into the ocean, it ceases to be a wave, that is, it loses its shape. But what is the essence of the ocean or the essence of the wave? Is it the shape or the water? You cannot say, as does the pantheist, that in the case of the ocean the essence is water, and in the case of the wave it is its form. In both cases it must be the water, that is, the content, not the form. When the wave, then, sinks back into the ocean it does not lose its essence, nor did it change its essence when it became a wave. So is it with the relation between the Infinite Spirit and the finite. If the essence of the finite spirit is what we know it to be in the state of self-consciousness, we have a right to say that the essence of the Infinite Spirit must be a similar power; at any rate, we have no right to say with the newer pantheist that the Infinite Spirit must

be in essence "unconscious force." A better figure to illustrate the relation between the Infinite Spirit and the finite is the genetic relation that exists between parent and child. The spiritual self in both the parent and the child, as we saw in the last section, cannot be reduced to the bodily organism. The child, it is true, depends for its existence upon its parents, and the parents exist in a sense in the child; but though the child owes its existence to the parent and though the parents exist in a sense in the child, the coming into existence of the spiritual self of the child has not diminished the spiritual self of either the father or the mother. If any thing, it has enhanced it. In the spiritual realm there is this power we call creation, that is, a cause and effect relation without the cause simply becoming the effect. Or again, when I communicate a thought to twenty five pupils, my thought may be considered as the cause of the thought in the minds of the twenty five pupils, but it has not simply passed into an effect; I still may retain it after I have given it. At any rate, I, the original cause of the thought, which now has been multiplied by twenty five, have not passed into the effect and ceased to exist as a cause. The Infinite Spirit, God, in similar manner may be the ultimate cause of the finite spirits without thereby passing into the effect. So when we say that the spiritual self is an entity different from

the Infinite Spirit, we do not thereby affirm that the spiritual self of man is self-existent. To repeat, in self-consciousness I know that I am an entity and not merely a fragment of the Great All coming into consciousness. It is not the Great All that is conscious in me, but I am conscious of *myself*, which self is not the same as the "not self." And back of this consciousness I cannot possibly pass.

But to come to the second point, namely, that the finite spirit lapses into unconsciousness at physical death. On what grounds does the Pantheist deny the finite spirit the power of consciousness after death? Has he any reason for this denial, or is it not that this conclusion grows out of a confusion of thought? He starts aright, for he starts where all philosophers since the days of Descartes and Kant must start, namely, with the *thinking self* which must ever be "the fixed point over against all doubt, and especially as the starting point for the construction of our world." He reasons aright when he says that we must interpret the world without in terms of the spiritual self rather than interpret the spiritual self in terms of the world without, as the materialist does. "The world is more than Nature, and we do not experience Spirit from the standpoint of Nature, but Nature from the standpoint of Spirit." He recognizes clearly, then, that psychical phenomena are not the

resultant of the physical organism, but that they flow from the spiritual self. He even intimates that what we call the material world is but "a manifestation of spirit;" at least, that if Dualism is untenable and we must have Monism, it must be a spiritual Monism rather than materialistic. So far, so good. But here the strange reasoning begins. Though Spirit is the ultimate reality, and though matter is but the manifestation of Spirit, that is, the spiritual self "objectified," the power of consciousness, he says, depends upon this objectifying, or rather upon a certain arrangement of this objectified spirit. Or to put it in concrete language; my spiritual self is real. It is responsible for the organization of the material that makes up my body, which material is really only "a manifestation of Spirit." But the power of consciousness which I now have, is due to the special organization of this material—this "mere manifestation."

In answer to this let us be reminded of what we said in connection with materialism and what the pantheist himself professes to hold, namely, that psychical phenomena cannot be reduced to physical phenomena. The one cannot be spoken of in terms of the other, and so it would be absurd to say that the mechanical force in nature is the ultimate and that it can ever become the psychic force in human thinking. Since psychic force cannot be reduced to mechanical force, and since

consciousness is a psychical phenomenon, how can the pantheist say that the Great Unconsciousness comes into consciousness only in man; and especially how can he say that the spiritual self loses this power of consciousness at physical death, when physical death is but a *dissolution of forces that can never as such be the cause of psychical phenomena*? Is not the Pantheist's conclusion due to a confusion of thought and the confusion being this, that in one case he assumes that the Ultimate is after the nature of man's spiritual self, while in the second case he holds that the Ultimate is simply Nature, and Nature, too, conceived in a rather materialistic fashion? If the Ultimate is Spirit, as the pantheist professes to hold, then Spirit is not only the cause of what we call the material world—nature in the narrower sense—but also the cause of consciousness. It is more rational to refer consciousness directly to spirit than to make it a resultant of "organized matter," which in turn is but, according to him, "a manifestation" of spirit. Since this is so, there is no adequate reason for the assertion of the pantheist that consciousness ceases at physical death which, according to his own theory, is but a dissolution of "a mere manifestation" of spirit. A "dissolution of a mere manifestation" of spirit cannot rob spirit of its supreme power.

Not only does the pantheist fail to explain the *how*



of consciousness in man, but he fails equally in answering the *why* of consciousness in the finite spirit. What is the purpose of consciousness at all, if it is to lapse again at physical death? Of course, on general principles the pantheist must repudiate the idea of purpose, for if the unconscious has a purpose in becoming conscious in the finite spirit, it must itself be conscious. But purpose there is in this universe; at least, the finite spirit is conscious of purpose. To that extent even the pantheist must admit the idea of purpose. What is the purpose, then, of the self-consciousness of the finite spirit, when answered from the Pantheist's standpoint? We are told that through the consciousness of the finite spirits the ultimate—the Infinite Spirit—“*realizes itself*.” And what is the highest point of this self realization of the Infinite in the finite? Simply this, that the Infinite Spirit realizes that its real essence is unconsciousness. The Great Unconscious, then, comes into consciousness in man for a brief duration in order that it might know that its real essence is *not-knowing*; that it might be *conscious* of the fact that in reality it is *not conscious*—a wonderful thing indeed. This is the absurdity to which the Newer Pantheism is reduced.

Not only then does the pantheist fail to show any sufficient reason for denying the power of conscious-

ness to the individual beyond physical death, but his fundamental conception of the Ultimate as an Unconscious Force is itself untenable.

The most serious objections to the belief in a continued conscious existence of the individual after physical death, then, cannot legitimately be put in the form of asserting that such an existence is *impossible*. Even to assert that such an existence is *improbable* is necessary only when one is wedded to certain systems of thought which at bottom are self contradictory and inconsistent with the best known facts of human experience, namely, the facts known in self-consciousness in which the spiritual self appears as the deepest of realities, and a reality, too, which though it knows itself as akin to other realities, at the same time knows itself also as a separate entity.

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## II.

### SOME ARGUMENTS FOR IMMORTALITY.

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#### 1. THE METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT.

In stating the objections to the doctrine of immortality in the last chapter we also tried to answer these objections, and in so doing we have already advanced some positive reasons for the belief in immortality. Some of the points made are sometimes given as separate arguments; especially what we said about the nature of memory and the consciousness of unity and sameness present in self consciousness, could be given as an independent argument. We do not wish to repeat these points in full here. We refer to some of them, it is true, but from a different standpoint.

But let us come at once to what we have called in the heading of this section the Metaphysical Argument.

Man has an instinctive conviction that what is real cannot cease to be. Things may change in appearance, but not change from something into nothing.

Compounds may be divided and simple things may be combined, but that which makes up the compounds or the simple things cannot suddenly pass out of existence. This, we say, is an instinctive conviction. But it is more than this. It seems also to be borne out by experience. At least, the physical sciences, in their great doctrine of the indestructibility of matter and the doctrine of the correaltion and conservation of energy, assert as fundamental the belief that nothing that is, ever ceases to be.

The first of these doctrines asserts that the number of atoms remains ever the same. Their combination is constantly changing. They are ever appearing in new forms, but they never really disappear. A drop of water, for example, may be changed into ice, or be dissolved into gases. That is, it may be a liquid, a solid, or a gas; but the atoms of hydrogen and oxygen, which are combined in water ( $H_2O$ ), are essentially the same through all these changes. Not one is lost, that is, none lapses into nothingness.

The second doctrine asserts the same about force or energy. The manifestation of it may be totally different at different times, but essentially it is force. The force of gravitation, for example, potential in a body of water on a higher level may be released by letting it flow to a lower level. If it is properly harnessed, it may turn the turbines of a power house

which converts the energy into electricity, and this may be conducted over wires to a neighboring city and there made to turn the wheels of our street cars, to warm our parlors, or to give us light by which we read our evening papers. The energy that appears in all these forms is the same, and though much of it may escape with the process of changing it from falling water to electric light, none of it is really destroyed.

Our instinctive conviction, then, that nothing which really is, can cease to be, seems to be borne out by our limited experience; at least, this seems to hold good in the physical sphere of existence. Guided by this same instinctive feeling, are we wrong when we assert that the same principle must hold good in the spiritual world?

In answer to materialism we showed that what we call the spirit of man is essentially not a material substance nor can it be adequately expressed in terms of mechanical or physical energy. We saw further that it is a reality of its own. In fact, it is the reality of all realities best known to man; for he knows himself as a spiritual existence through self-consciousness. In what makes up man, then,—body and spirit—we saw that the latter is as real as the former. Spirit is a reality totally different from the atoms that make up the body, likewise is it totally different from the

nerve and brain movements of this body. That is, it is a reality that is not the same as the atoms of the body nor the same as the energy or force of these atoms. It is a reality whose existence we know most certain, for we know it through self-consciousness, that is, we know it immediately. It is this reality which asserts in the name of modern science that it knows instinctively and from experience that matter and force are eternal. What about spirit, the self which makes this assertion? Is it eternal? It is a reality sufficiently real to assert the reality and indestructibility of that which is not itself. Is it, then, not a reality sufficiently real to be likewise indestructible? We should think so.

To begin with, we call attention to what we said in the last chapter, namely, that since the days of Kant modern epistemology starts with the "thinking self as the fixed point over against all doubt, and especially as the starting point for the construction of the world." When, then, modern science makes statements as to the reality or eternity of matter and force, the statements are based on the assumption of the existence of the thinking self. To deny the existence of this thinking self, or to reduce it to anything less than a primary metaphysical reality, would manifestly undermine the validity of all knowledge. Spirit, as we have shown repeatedly in the last chapter, cannot



be reduced to a mere phenomenon which accompanies a certain physical combination and, therefore, would cease if the combination were dissolved. It is, so to speak, a *primary* metaphysical reality. Even the old Greeks knew this. Speaking of spirit in terms of substance, they held that it was a *simple* substance, that is, a oneness which cannot be destroyed by decomposition; and this, they said, is shown by the unity of the self known in self-consciousness.<sup>1</sup> That is, however, varied our psychical life may be, whatever conflicting thoughts and emotions we may have, we always know these experiences, these thoughts and emotions to be *our* experiences, *our* thoughts and emotions. The human spirit, the self, is a unity—an indissoluble entity. And what these philosophers said over two thousand years ago we have not outgrown to-day, though we may express the idea in different terms. Perhaps no one in modern times has put the matter more clearly than Herbert Spencer himself when he says: "If we say that the successive impressions and ideas which constitute consciousness are affections of the Mind, which as being the subject of them is the real Ego, we imply that the Ego is an entity. If we say that these impressions and ideas are themselves the varied body of this substance—the modified forms

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1. Compare what we said in Chapter I, Section 2 about the consciousness of *unity*.

which it from time to time assumes—this still asserts that the conscious self exists as a permanent continuous being, since modifications necessarily involve something modified. If we take the sceptic's position and argue that our impressions and ideas themselves are to us the only existences, and that personality said to underlie them is a fiction, we still make the very assumption which we repudiate. For an impression necessarily implies something impressed; even the sceptic must consider these as *his* impressions and ideas. And if he admits, as he must, that he has an impression of his personal existence, what warrant can he show for rejecting this impression as unreal while he accepts all his other impressions as real?"<sup>1</sup> We might point out in this connection that when Oriental philosophy speaks of the Ego as an illusion, it must be an illusion to something or somebody. Or, if consciousness is but a cross-section of the mental life, as some moderns say, it must be a cross section of a something, and that something is the Ego—an entity which cannot be further dissolved.

That what we call the Ego is a oneness and hence a reality which cannot be decomposed, as for example molecules are decomposed into atoms and these into ions and so forth, is further shown by the imperious

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1. First Principles. p. 47 abridged.

demand of our minds for reducing all the varied experiences of life to a unity. Whence, for example, comes this thirst of all thinkers for a monistic interpretation of the universe seen in all ages? Surely not from experience of the world without, for that is pluralistic in the extreme. It must come from a reality within—from the Ego which is conscious of itself as being one. Only in modern times has it been recognized that the only unity without that is possible is a noetic unity, that is, a unity that is imposed from within—from the knowing Ego. Or more clearly, everything without the Ego is one and a unity in the sense only that it can be known by a one, namely, the Ego. From any other viewpoint the world without is pluralistic; at least dualistic. The most perfect idea of oneness is the idea of self perceived in the act of self consciousness. When I, for example, think the thought "I," or "I am," or "I do this and that," I am conscious of a something which is one, however much the one may be modified by the varied experiences of life. When I love intensely, I know myself to be the "I" that at other times has hated equally intensely. Deeper than the various thoughts and emotions that make up my mental life lies this consciousness of self—this consciousness of a primary reality which is the measure of everything not itself. Every monistic system of thought, then, is not so

much the outgrowth of experience as it is the result of the Ego imposing itself upon the pluralistic world and compelling it into a oneness. So it is that every monistic system of thought is but a monument to the unity of the spiritual self.

As the Ego knows itself through self consciousness, it is perhaps impossible to demonstrate its existence to one who does not know it thus. But to every one who turns his thoughts inward it must be clear that the Ego is that by which the "plurality of psychical experiences is comprehended into a unity of consciousness not further definable."<sup>1</sup> Or again, the self "is not merely, as we are so often told, 'the sum total of our cerebral functions,' but a unity in the midst of these which apprehends and unifies their results, and, in a large measure, direct and controls their operations."<sup>2</sup>

The Ego, then, is a reality of the first order, that is, it is not the result of compounds, as it were, which at death might be dissolved and thus destroyed, but it is a primary metaphysical entity back of which we cannot go. If science says that matter and energy are eternal, a broader science shows that the reality which we know best of all, namely through self-consciousness, is also a reality that will not lapse into nothingness. If any one feels that what we have said makes

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1. Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy. p. 129.

2. Walter, Theism and Spiritual Movism. p. 413.

for a dualistic conception of the universe and that we must have Monism at all cost, we reply ; let us hold on to the reality best known, namely, *the reality of the spiritual self without which it is impossible to assert reality at all.*

## 2. ARGUMENT FROM THE "UNIVERSALITY OF THE BELIEF."

Of all the beliefs that mankind has held from the earliest ages to the present day no one can be said to be so nearly universal as the belief in a future existence. "So far as investigation has gone," says Professor Salmon, "belief in some sort of existence after death is found to be a catholic belief of humanity." Even the belief in the existence of God or gods is not more widely held, for the very gods of some religions are nothing but the deified spirits of departed heroes ; and in lands where the conception of God is so vague as to almost vanish into nothingness, the cult of ancestor worship flourishes.

If we had space it would be interesting to give at this point a brief review of the different forms which this cardinal belief of the human race has taken in different climes and times. Suffice it to say, that in regard to the *nature* of that future existence the conceptions have ranged all the way from a shadowy, dream-like, feeble existence to a state where man

shall enjoy all his powers to the full. The rather remarkable thing is that in some of the most ancient literature we find conceptions of the greatest hope, so that we read in Rig-Veda (1000-1500 B.C.) about "that everlasting and imperishable world where there is eternal light and glory." The gloomier conceptions of the "dread cycle of births and deaths" and the "gloom of Karma" are of later origin. In Buddhism itself, Nirvana, so commonly interpreted by western writers as meaning complete absorption and practical annihilation, represents to many believers a state of perfect knowledge and bliss, so that the Christian conception in John 17:3. "This is life eternal that they might know Thee the only true God, etc.," would not seem strange to them.

If the conception of the *nature* of the future life has varied much, the conception as to who is to share the joys of this life have been equally varied. They range all the way from the belief that the happy life is for the privileged few and the others either annihilated or condemned to unhappiness, to the belief that practically all mankind shall inherit, sooner or later, the bliss of that existence.

Now this belief in some sort of immortality has been held, not simply by the masses of mankind from age to age, but in all ages the best thinkers have been among the believers. The *Phaedo* of a Plato is a



monument to this belief erected by the Prince of ancient Philosophers; and if the thinkers who have lived since Plato have torn down this monument, they have done so only to build it up again on a larger scale. In our own day and generation it is still true that the majority of mankind believe in a future life. Not only a majority of mankind in general but, judging from the tenor of modern religious and philosophical literature, it seems clear that among the leaders of thought there is a large majority who hold to the great essentials of this master belief of mankind. Of course, it is true that among scholars we have little of those dogmatic assertions as to the exact nature and extent of the life beyond the grave, but as we said above, they hold to the great essentials.

Now in the first place, we must admit that what thinking men in all ages have held to be true is not a matter to be dismissed lightly. Of course, what most men have always believed is not necessarily true merely because they have believed it; but when we find that the human race, which differs so widely in so many ways, agrees essentially in affirming an existence after death, we must take the fact into consideration. It has often been pointed out that all mankind, for example, once believed that the sun moved from east to west and not the earth from west to east and there-

fore, that all mankind may be quite wrong in its beliefs. True enough, all mankind at one time made a mistake in thinking that the sun moved from east to, west across the horizon ; but all mankind was right in asserting the existence of a something they called the sun which gave them light and heat. They were right when they said that in the morning the sun was seen on the east side of their house, at noon overhead, and in the evening it appeared on the western horizon. That is, though they were wrong in some particulars, they were not all wrong. So it is with the belief in the future life. Mankind may be wrong in some particulars—in fact, it must be so since the views differ widely in regard to certain particulars, but it would seem strange if there were not some objective reality that corresponds to this almost universal belief.

But this is not all. It is not merely a majority vote that we have in favor of the belief in a future life. We must ask the question, why has mankind on the whole believed in an existence after death ?

The first step in answering this question is to remember that though among civilized races we find the belief to be a reasoned one, still even in such cases the reasoned belief is only as a support to what men had already believed. That is, mankind seems to have reached this conviction intuitively.

tively; not through a careful logical process of the philosophers, though this too we find, and then disseminated among the common people, but rather spontaneously, as it were,—very much, for example, the way in which mankind has trusted the validity of his five senses.

Now when we analyze this intuitive conviction still further, we find two main factors in it. The first of these is the natural horror every man has of annihilation, or what amounts to the same thing, “the will to live,” or “the instinct for self preservation.” “To the Greeks,” says Plutarch, “the idea of annihilation was intolerable. If they had no choice left between entire extinction and an eternity of torment in Hades, they would have chosen the latter; almost all, both men and women, would have surrendered themselves to the teeth of Cerberus, or the buckets of Danaïdæ rather than to nonentity.” Perhaps most men to-day would prefer annihilation to eternal torture; but this would be choosing only the lesser of two evils. Annihilation is never looked upon by the normal man as desirable in itself. Even if one interprets the Nirvana of Buddhism as meaning annihilation, it is only considered a happy lot because it is primarily an escape from a dread cycle of births and deaths where suffering far out-weighs happiness. Or take the suicide who wilfully ends his life. Even he is not

prompted by a desire to be annihilated, but simply by a belief that he can improve his lot through a departure from this present life. The desire for life or the instinct for self preservation is fundamental to all conscious life, and only when man has been defeated and what he considers hopelessly beaten, will he seek a way of escape from evil—never from life as such. We are made to love life and that love for life is at least one fountain head of our great hope for an endless life.

Now the second factor in this intuitive conviction of a future existence is the fact that man is at least dimly conscious of belonging to an order greater and above the narrow limitations which surround him. "The stir of powers within him too vast for earth's small scene and hour, and all the deep instincts of his soul, set him apart from the brutes, not by a temporary and adventitious difference, but by one which is essential and speaks of a future to which no bounds can be set." Or in the words of Professor Gates, "When I am aware of my consciousness, I feel and know that there is in it a factor that was present primordially in the beginning of the cosmos. This feeling is a part of my consciousness just as surely as is my love for scientific research or my desire for world-betterment or my veneration for the all; I did not put these feelings there—I found them there

when I grew old enough to introspect my mind and there, in spite of recurrent doubt and criticism, they have remained." That is, we have by nature an instinctive feeling that we are more than a temporary phenomenon of a few years duration, but that we belong to that which abides.

In answer to the question then, why mankind has believed in an existence after death, we reply; it is because he has a horror of annihilation and a desire or will to live, and further because he has at least a dim intuitive insight into the essence of things which shows him that he belongs to an order above time and earth's limitations. We, of course, do not wish to imply that these are the only factors which have given rise to a belief in a future existence but they seem to be the most nearly universal and primary ones.

But we must ask the further question, why has man this horror of annihilation and love of life, and why has he this feeling of being greater than his earth life? To this there seems to be no more reasonable answer than to say: Man has these feelings because the Cause which has made him has left its own impress upon him. To say that these feelings and intuitions are lies is to say that man's deepest instincts are lies. Why they should be there if they stand for nothing real is inexplicable. The most normal

explanation, we would think, is to say that they are there because they have come from a reality and point to a reality.

The argument from the universality of the belief then resolves itself into what we might call the Argument from Man's Instinctive Craving for Immortality. As being a mere majority vote of mankind in favor of immortality the above argument has, perhaps, not so much weight; but when we see that mankind on the whole has believed in immortality because it grows out of the very nature of man—out of his instincts—we begin to see its full weight. In this new form we shall give it briefly as a separate argument; for while, as we said, it gives real weight to the Argument from the Universality of the Belief, it constitutes at the same time an independent one. As such, we take it up next.

### 3. ARGUMENT FROM MAN'S INSTINCTIVE CRAVING FOR IMMORTALITY.

As we said in the last section, man has a natural horror of annihilation and an instinctive craving for an existence beyond death. What is the real significance of this? When we examine our other instinctive desires, we find that they represent realities: they are produced by external realities and point to realities.



Take first an example from the lower group of our natural desires, the desire for food, let us say. Clearly this grows out of the very nature of the bodily organism. The feeling of hunger is a signal of the legitimate needs of the body. It is not simply an invitation to an act which is accompanied by a sensation of pleasure; the sensation of pleasure accompanies it, rather because the act of eating is in obedience to the real needs of the body. Not only is the feeling of hunger or the desire for food a truthful signal of the body's needs, but these needs find their objective counterpart in the food that exists. That is, the desire points to a something, and that something exists.

To go a step higher: There is the desire for knowledge in every normal mind. Even the child before it can possibly appreciate the *advantage* of knowledge has an almost insatiable desire to know. The questions *what* and *why* are asked with such constancy and persistency that even the fond parents grow weary. Now in response to this desire for knowing the what and the why of things there are rational answers to be given—at least practically so. That is, the world in which we live is so made that it responds to the inquiring mind in a rational manner. For the desire for knowledge there is a knowable reality—at least it is sufficiently knowable to satisfy our practical needs.

To give but one more illustration: There is the almost universal desire for companionship of one sort or another. No more real is affinity between atoms in the chemical world than is the desire for fellowship in the heart of man. Man is above all a social being. He is not fully man if this social instinct is hampered. But for this desire, this need for fellowship, there is a reality to correspond to it. The reality of friendship, it is true, can not be measured by the physicist nor analysed by the chemist, but it is nevertheless a reality so real that without it life would not be worth living.

In some such way we could go through the entire list of man's normal desires and show that they all point to external realities. They are not lies.

And now what about man's strong and persistent craving for life—for a life longer and greater than this brief, imperfect, earthly existence? As we saw in the last section, this is a universal craving common to all races in all times. Shall we say that all other instinctive desires point to a reality but that this one does not? Shall we say that in little things our instincts are to be trusted but not in great things? Surely not. We are not saying that the desire for knowledge, for example, makes things rational, or that the desires for immortality makes immortality possible. The opposite is rather the case; because this is a rational universe and because man is a part of it he

has a thirst for knowledge. How else could it be? We cannot imagine how man could ever have become a rational being with a desire for truth, if he were not himself the product of reason. Our instinctive desires do not make external realities; they point to realities by which they themselves have been caused.

If man then has among his instinctive desires this one for an endless life, we can account for it only on the ground that it was implanted by that reality which is eternal. To say that this one does not point to a reality, would make it an anomaly; an anomaly, too, which has been a tremendous factor in the development of mankind. For no one thought has been such an inspiration for the higher life as the belief in immortality. Rightly has it been called the master-thought of the race. All the nobler sentiments and all the heroic achievements in the world of morals have had this thought as an inspiration, if not as the chief motive. Call the roll of those who have served their fellow men and helped them to higher plains of life and you will find them among those who look upon this life as but the first chapter of life. Not that they have been inspired by the hope of a reward beyond the grave, but by the thought that human life is something of immense value because it has the possibility of an eternal blessed existence. When men know that character and

character alone abides the wreck of time, it serves as a powerful inspiration to live nobly and love righteousness—in short, to live that higher life of the soul which alone gives human life a worth above that of brute and inanimate nature. On the other hand, where faith in the permanent value of the individual life is lacking or dim, all striving for the higher things of life is paralyzed. For what inspiration is there to work for the uplift of humanity, if the individuals that make up humanity sink again into nothingness after an ephemeral existence of seventy or eighty years?

If then this craving instinct for immortality points to a lie and not a reality, we are compelled to say that a lie has been the chief factor in the development of the human race along those lines that mark it off so clearly from the rest of the animal world. Far more reasonable would it be, we think, to hold that this master-belief of the human race, born of an instinctive craving, represents an objective reality.

“It must be so, Plato, thou reasonst well,  
Else why this pleasing hope, this fond desire,  
This longing after immortality?  
Or whence this secret dread, this inward horror  
Of falling into naught? Why shrinks the soul  
Back on herself and startles at destruction?  
'Tis the divinity that stirs within us,

'Tis Heaven itself that points out an hereafter,  
And intimates eternity to man."

(From The Dialogues.)

#### 4. ARGUMENT FROM THE CAPACITY OF MAN'S NATURE FOR INFINITE GROWTH.

Man has not only an intense desire for a future life, as we saw in the last two sections, but his nature suggests a capacity for almost endless growth. Human life suggests by its very capacities that it must have more than a brief existence of seventy or eighty years to fully realize itself. Take man's mental life for example. How fragmentary is the knowledge of the individual in comparison with the sum total of all human knowledge! The day is past when a Leibnitz could be an authority on all lines. The field of knowledge has so widened in recent years that we are driven for lack of time to specialize. And again, how fragmentary is the sum total of human knowledge with what we believe is knowable! The further we push back the ring of darkness that surrounds us, the more evident does it become that we live only on the *threshold* of truth. Our most far reaching telescopes increase, it is true, the number of the visible stars, but they do not, apparently, decrease the number of stars still to be discovered. Our powerful microscopes have opened to us new worlds in the infinitely small, but

in this direction, too, the goal of the knowable wonders of existence seems to be ever receding and so inviting the mind on into endless vistas of knowledge. Now the remarkable thing about it all is that though the knowledge of any individual mind is quite limited in comparison with the known and especially with the knowable, still the mind of every normal man has capacities far beyond what it can realize in this brief earthly life. There is nothing known by any individual which the average mind could not understand if properly explained. The reason we have to specialize in this age is because life is too short to know everything ; not because the mind is incapable of knowing more than one line of knowledge. A specialist in Psychology may know very little about Astronomy, but there is nothing known by experts in Astronomy which the Psychologist could not know and understand if he applied himself long enough to the matter. It is true, the Psychologist might not become a leader in Astronomy, but he could follow as far as any leader might lead. And if this is the relation of the individual mind to the sum total of what is known, we are not wrong in saying that it holds the same relation to the knowable. That is, this being a rational universe and man being a rational being, he can understand in a progressive way this knowable universe. This capacity of the human mind



for this endless growth in knowledge suggests very strongly that the mind must have a future life in which it can realize itself to the full of its capacity. If we live in a rational universe, Paul was right when he said. "Now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known." Our partial knowledge, and yet the capacity for a fuller knowledge, demands a future where this may be attained.

Or again, let us take man's moral nature. What the best man is, the worst man might become; at least, it would seem so when we remember how the meanest of men have become self-respecting, upright members of society. We are not saying by what power such transformations have taken place, but merely stating facts. All our ordinary efforts at moral education and our extraordinary efforts such, for example, as Reformatory Schools, indicate that moral education is possible even for the worst of men. But the remarkable thing about the moral consciousness of man is that it never reaches its goal in this life. Not that the goal is unreal, for nothing makes a greater difference in life than ethical distinctions, but that the goal recedes as man approaches and so invites him on to perfection.

"Our reach exceeds <sup>our</sup> grasp, or else what were a Heaven for," says Browning. In these words he puts the matter in an inverse order. Because Heaven is, our reach exceeds our grasp, he says. The opposite

is equally true, namely, the reach exceeds the grasp and, therefore, Heaven must be.

This receding of the goal of moral perfection explains why often the purest know themselves the vilest; why an Isaiah cries out, "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: For mine eyes have seen the King, Jehovah of hosts." Isaiah had seen the standard of ethical perfection and therefore, he saw his own short-comings. Or to take the case of Paul;—His writings prove him to have been a man keenly alive to moral distinctions, and yet he spoke of himself as the "chief of sinners" and said, "Not that I have already obtained, or am already made perfect; but I press on." But we need not go back so far. We know that the sweetest and purest lives of our own acquaintances are most modest in regard to their moral achievements; for they know that they are not what they might be, and that the path to perfection is a long one. The moral depths of human life, we repeat, are such that they cannot be fully realised during this brief and imperfect earthly existence. To repeat words already quoted above: "The stir of powers within him too vast for earth's small scene and hour, and all the deep instincts of his soul, set him apart from the brutes, not by a temporary and adventitious difference, but by one

which is essential and speaks of a future to which no bounds can be set."

All other forms of existence seem to have reached a perfection of their kind. The lion is to all purposes a perfect lion; the spider, a perfect spider. There are no latent powers in them undeveloped because life is too short. It cannot be said that when an aged lion lies down to die that great capacities for development have been cut off. His little system has its day, it has its day and ceases to be. But not so is it with an aged man. True, his body seems to have run its full circuit of life and is fit only to return to the dust whence it came. But his spirit is otherwise; at least in the case of the man who has on earth lived the higher life. Its vision is undimmed by age, its desire for infinite perfection unquenched by "death's cold, sullen stream"; for it feels itself capable of greater things, of further progress.

"Progress, man's distinctive mark alone,  
Not God's and not the beasts'; God is, they are,  
Man partly is and wholly hopes to be."

—Browning's "Death in the Desert,"  
lines 576-568.

Now the power, call it Nature or what you will, that has made us as it has, that has endowed us with powers mental, moral, and spiritual, far greater than

can be fully realized during these brief years on earth, cannot cut us off just when we *begin* to realize these powers. It is as if one should build foundations suggesting magnificent palaces, but never building thereon. No, it cannot be but that our partial knowledge is but the part of a whole which some day we shall know, and that our broken ideals in our moral and spiritual life are but fragments of a higher ideal which shall some day be attained.

The longer one thinks on the depths of human life and the infinite wonders of existence that surround life, the more evident does it become that our earth life is but the alphabet of a life that is to be. We catch but glimpses here of that endless vista of light and truth because as yet we are unable to see more, but our nature is such that it contains a promise and a potency which will some day be developed and so enable us to see clearly and understand fully what only seers and poets dimly discern. To the thoughtful the night of death need not be terrifying. It is but the curtain which separates us from the beyond and which when once drawn, will reveal to us what our present life conceals :

Mysterious Night ! when our first parent knew  
Thee by report Divine, and heard thy name,  
Did he not tremble for this goodly frame,  
This glorious canopy of light and blue ?

But through a curtain of translucent dew  
Bathed in the hues of the great setting flame,  
Hesperus with the host of Heaven came,  
And lo! creation broadened to man's view.  
Who would have guessed such darkness lay concealed  
Within thy beams, O Sun! or who divined  
Whilst bird, and flower, and insect stood revealed,  
Thou to such countless worlds hadst made us blind?  
Why should we, then, shun death with anxious strife,  
If Light conceals so much, wherefore not Life?

Sonnet to Night. Joseph Blanco White.

#### 5. ARGUMENT FROM REASON AS MANIFESTED IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD.

As we look at Nature around us, we see everywhere the evidence of Reason. This is a cosmos in which we live, not a chaos. It is a Universe, we say; and by that we mean that things hang together in a rational manner.

That the world about us is intelligible, that it responds to reason, is the tacit presupposition of all science. All this modern talk about the laws of nature, which some men worship as things ultimate, simply means that modern science knows that everything acts in an orderly and rational manner; and where science does not know it through experi-

ence, it assumes it. Given the same causes, we know that the same results must follow. If the results are different, we infer, and rightly so, that the causes must have been different. This, in short, is the practical creed of creeds for all scientists to whatever school of philosophy or religion they may belong. In fact, no science could be possible, if nature were not rational. To quote a few representative men on this point: "All science starts with the tacit presupposition that nature is intelligible, that there is reason or thought in things; and its progress is only the ever advancing discovery of laws, of rational relations, of a coherent, self consistent system, in the object and events of the material world. The history of science is the history of Mind or Intelligence finding itself in Nature.—If Nature were chaos without law or order or intelligible constitution, knowledge would be impossible, thought could find in the outward world nothing to grasp. But it is because law, rational order and sequence, in one word, because reason exists in nature that nature yields itself up to thought or intelligence.....Throughout the whole realm of nature there is nothing irrational or unintelligible."<sup>1</sup> Or in the words of Walker: "Anything that can be rightly called knowledge is possible only because our

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1. Principal Caird, *Intorduction to the Philosophy of Religion*. pp. 28, 238, 240.



minds are in relation to a rationally constituted, that is, spiritual world."

The presupposition of science that all nature is intelligible is being justified every day by the *experience* of science. Of course, the observations of science must ever be very much limited, but as far as observations have been made, nature has always been found to operate according to rational laws. Says Romanes, "Science finds that nature is instinct with reason; tap her where you will, reason oozes out at every pore."

A third point to be observed is that nature is rational not only in all its parts, but the parts work together with other parts, and so make a rational order of nature as a whole. That is, they hang together in their operations. The law of gravitation, for example, is not merely a rational law that holds good with everything material in the universe, but this same law controls, as it were, the orderly movements of the whole sidereal kingdom; and so it makes possible seasons, and day and night, which phenomena in turn determine the nature of the whole order of life found on this globe of ours.

Now when we see that nature is a rational order and especially that its rational laws seem to be working together, it is impossible to escape the impression that this marvelous system of rational laws, so clearly

exhibited by modern science, must be working out some grand purpose. This purpose may be difficult to see if one limits one's view of nature to a fragment in space and time. That is, the specialist in any one department of science may fail to see any purpose in nature as a whole; but he who will take the true philosophic standpoint, namely in the center of all sciences, and especially he who will take a long range view, not simply in space but in time also, cannot fail to see that this rational universe is working out some purpose. What else than this is the true significance of the Theory of Evolution when applied to the Universe as a whole?

When we say this, we do not forget that many advocates of the evolutionary theory repudiate the idea of purpose. Evolution, they say, is but the method which nature pursues in its operations. It signifies merely that the rational order we call nature has been operating in a progressive way in the development of the forms of life as we know them to-day, and that this development is still going on and will probably go on; to what end or purpose, they will not say. Perhaps it is well that the average scientist goes no further in his application of this great principle. After all, this belongs to the philosopher whose servants the scientists are. He is thankful for what his servants have discovered about the operations of

nature's laws. He is more than happy to know that science bears him out in what he has always hoped, namely, that this world of ours is a huge nursery for the development of the lower into the higher, for the production of an ascending series of things valuable, for the bringing into existence the "fittest," and especially that it is a universe where the fittest is said to survive.

But we must not run ahead of our evidence. Thus far we have only obtained the principle of evolution as representing the method nature employs in its operations to produce a progressive series of life. There remains to be asked the vital question as to what is the standard of progress. When we speak of "higher and higher forms of life" being produced, or of the "fittest" and the "survival of the fittest," what do we mean? We will not stop here to give the scientists theory of cosmic evolution from star mist to the present state, nor even his ascending scale of animal life from the protozoa to man; but simply to say that *man* is regraded by all as the highest. The standard of life is man, that is, he is the measure of the rest of the world. The world process, then, that science exhibits as working in a progressive way has produced nothing thus far higher or more fit to survive than man. In this all scientists would agree.

The next question to be asked is: Why is man

regarded as the highest form of life known to the scientist? Is it because he is among the last to appear in point of time, or because he is crowding out other forms of life and so proving that because he survives he is fittest to survive? This would hardly be maintained by any one, for the last in a series is not necessarily the greatest. On the contrary, the very law of evolution was discovered because the scientist observed that man, as he is to-day, is a higher form of life than the earlier forms of animal existence. Man is the highest, not because he is among the last in a series, nor because he survives and crowds out other forms of life, but because he is the highest judged by standards which all thinking men accept; namely, because, he is a rational, willing, moral being—in short, a personal being. He is the first being that has the power to understand the world process; the first being that reflects what is ultimate in this rational universe, or as men of old said, he and he alone of all creation was made “in the image of God,” and so is the crown of creation or the goal of evolution.

Modern evolutionary science, then, more than ever exalts man above the rest of nature. Perhaps not in the same way, but in a more rational way, since its exaltation of man is based upon a more careful investigation of his existing relation to the rest of the world. “That which the Pre-Copernian Astronomy

naively thought to do by placing the home of man in the center of the universe the Darwinian biology profoundly accomplishes by exhibiting man as the terminal fact in the stupenduous process of evolution whereby things have come to be what they are. In the despest sense is it as true as it was ever held to be; that the world was made for man and that the bringing forth in him those qualities which we call highest and holiest is the final cause of creation."<sup>1</sup> . . .

If the theory of evolution is correct, then, in representing the world process in its actual operations of producing an ascending scale of life, we must look not to the beginnings of this process, but to what the process has thus far accomplished, if we would understand the real significance of it all. We cannot rest satisfied with simply asserting that nature is making progress, but we must look for the deeper meaning. When we do this, we cannot fail to see that man himself, as a personal being, is the real explanation of the principle of development exhibited in the theory of evolution. "The principle of development and the principle of personality are complementary; Personality being end and not means, development being means and not end."<sup>2</sup>

The meaning, then, of the stupenduous world

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1. John Fiske, *The Destiny of Man*.

2. Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*. . . p. 274.

process is the bringing forth of personality. We do not mean to say that everything in the universe merely subserves this one end and this only, for every form of existence finds in its own existence a partial explanation. Or to put it concretely: Every animal and every plant exists in part for itself, but in an equally true sense, they also exist for the sake of something other than themselves. The lower exist for themselves, to be sure, but also for the sake of the higher. And, as we have said, the highest existence on earth is man—a personal being. Personality is the apex of the Universe Pyramid.

The question that now arises is as to the future of of this rational world process that has thus far produced, as its best, personality. Science assumes, and has a right to assume, that the rational process of nature will go on in the future as in the past. A growing universe must tend towards infinity rather than towards zero. But along what lines will what is highest, namely, human personality, develop in the future? Assuredly, it must be along the lines that essentially constitute it a personality; that is, not along the line of bodily perfection, but along the line of the highest in man; the intellect, the feeling and the will—the three aspects of what we call personality. Paul was quite modern when he said, first that which is natural,



then that which is spiritual." The world process, then if it is to go on in the future as in the past, and if it is to make real progress over the past, must develop the highest forms of the present along those lines that really make them the highest; that is, it must develop man by the enrichment of his personality, enabling him to more perfectly think the truth, will the good, and feel the beautiful.

Now, does the short span of human history justify this expectation? Is man of to-day superior to ancient man? That is a rather difficult point to establish, for the period of known history is rather short. Two things, however, seem quite clear. The one is that the best in ancient times was not much inferior to the best of to-day in actual capacity, but only inferior in opportunity. The other point is that the race, as a whole, to-day is superior to the race as a whole of ancient times. No one can fail to see that the world as a whole is making progress, though it would be difficult to say that the best of to-day is much better than the best of the past. Or to put it a little differently, there is a larger number of the "better and best" than ever before in the history of the race.

And what is the significance of this, when looked at from the standpoint of evolution? Just this, that in the future the principle of development will go on.

but that its chief fruit will be the bringing up of the masses of mankind to a higher level,—to the level reached thus far only by the favored few, “The knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea” and “Thy kingdom (will) come,”—thy kingdom which is truth, righteousness and peace.

If the development of society to higher plains of life will be the main line along which the principle of evolution will work in the future, the question arises : How long shall this go on and what will be its ultimate culmination ? We are told it will go on for thousands and perhaps millions of years, and that human society will reach a stage of perfection beyond the dreams of the most sanguine Utopian. We are taught by altruists to sacrifice self and the mean present for future generations ; to live high and noble lives that our children may inherit better dispositions and so be more fit for the society that is to be, We are reminded that we are the heirs of the ages past, therefore, let us live so as to make a substantial contribution to this patrimony when we pass it on to those who follow us. And to these exhortations every right-minded man must respond. But, then what ? After we have sacrificed ourselves for future generations, will they reach the point which would justify the laborious process of the ages ? Is Reason,

which has worked through these millions of years to develop the myriad forms of life and to finally produce a human society made up of happy individuals,—is Reason, we ask, to be justified of her children? Let modern science again answer for us this question. This beautiful mother earth, which is now the home of man, may continue to support life, as we know it, for thousands and, perhaps, millions of years to come; but—there is a time coming when she shall know man no more. The earth will some day grow cold and die and in its death agonies break up again into primeval star mist. All life will cease, and the crown and goal of millions of years of struggle and evolution will end in zero. In the words of a recent writer: “The energy of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which for a moment has disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. ‘Imperishable monuments,’ and ‘immortal deeds,’ death itself and love stronger than death, will be as if they had not been. Nor will anything that is, be better or worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through

countless ages to effect." Just so,—if what? If man, *individual* man, the crown of creation and the goal of evolution is but a passing shadow like the rest. The immortality of the *race*, or the species as Ossler puts it, is nonsense; for the species-man will some day cease to exist on this globe of ours. All life on this earth will cease to be. All that this world process has produced will end in zero. It will end in zero if there is not a real "survival of the fittest." Unless *man*, not the race upon this globe—is *immortal*, the whole world process, which we are told is rational, must end in absolute folly. Reason, which is everywhere active producing higher and higher values, cannot fail to preserve the *highest*, if it is not to lapse into the irrational. The immortality of the soul, and it alone, can redeem this so-called rational universe from a mere jumble of meaningless phenomena. "If the world be that rational world which all science assumes it to be, it must have a rational meaning as a whole, and it must have an ultimate rational consummation. These are simply necessities of reason." Or in the words of John Fiske, to deny "the everlasting persistence of the spiritual element in man is to rob the whole process of its meaning."<sup>1</sup>

"The whole opening out of the spiritual life of humanity," says Professor Rudolf Eucken, "with the

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### 1. The Destiny of Man.

deepening of individual life and with the mighty labor of the world history, would be in vain, if all the individual forms swept by like fugitive shadows and forthwith sank into the abyss of complete nothingness, just as every event in time sinks down into ghost-like delusion when it is not sustained by, and cannot serve an eternal order."

"Evolutionary science exalts and enlarges the spiritual prospect of man, if we follow it far enough and are intellectually strong enough not to be stalled in any materialistic morass through which its first course may run."<sup>1</sup>

Says another recent writer: "No existing universe can tend on the whole towards contraction and decay; because that would foster annihilation and so any incipient attempt would not have survived; consequently an actually existing and flowing universe must, on the whole, cherish development, expansion, growth; and so tend towards infinity rather than towards zero." The infinity towards which the universe must tend, must be along the lines of man as a spiritual being. It must be through man's personal immortality and the infinite enrichment of that personality.

Or again in the words of Sir Oliver Lodge: "The law of evolution is that good shall, on the whole,

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1. Newman Smyth, *The Place of Death in Evolution*.

increase in the universe with the process of the sun ; that immortality itself is a special case of a more general law, namely, that in the whole universe nothing finally perishes that is worth keeping, that a thing once attained is not thrown away.

“ The general mutability and mortality in the world need not perturb us. The things we see perishing and dying are not of the same kind which we hope will endure. Death and decay, as we know them, are interesting physical processes which may be studied and understood ; they have seized the imagination of man, and govern his emotions, perhaps, unduly, but there is nothing in them to suggest ultimate destruction or the final triumph of ill ; they are necessary correlations to conception and birth into a material world ; they do not really contradict an optimistic view of existence.”

“ I wage not any feud with Death  
For changes wrought on form and face ;  
No lower life that earth's embrace  
May breed with him can fright my faith.  
Eternal process moving on  
From state to state the spirit walks ;  
And these are but the shattered stalks,  
Or ruin'd chrysalis of one.



Nor blame I Death, because he bore  
The use of virtue out of earth ;  
I know transplanted human worth  
Will bloom to profit, other where.

For this alone on Death I wreak  
The wrath that garners in my heart  
He put our lives so far apart  
We cannot hear each other speak.

—Tennyson's "In Memoriam,"  
Section 82.

If we admit, then, that reason is at work in this universe, and that this reason is an active reason working in a progressive way to produce higher and higher values, the highest being the spiritual self of man, we are irresistibly driven to the conclusion that these highest values must be preserved, if reason is not ultimately to lapse into the irrational.

This argument holds equally well against the materialistic and the pantheistic interpretation of life. The materialist, who says that all comes from star mist and ends in star mist, makes the universe no more the expression of folly than the pantheist, who makes all come from Unconscious Force and lapse into Unconscious Force. What we know of the universe is that its goal seems to be the development of individual beings with the power of consciousness,

and *self*-consciousness. To say that these lapse into unconsciousness and are lost in the great all is to stamp the world process as meaningless and worthless. On the other hand, a society of Immortals, made in the image of God and so worthy of being taken into eternal fellowship with Him *does* give meaning to the great rational world process which we conceive the universe to be.

#### 6. ARGUMENT FROM MAN'S MORAL NATURE.

In the last section we saw that if the Reason, which is manifested in the evolution of the world is not to lapse into the irrational, it must preserve the higher values it has been producing. Our reason demands this. Now, man is not simply a rational being ; he has another characteristic which is just as fundamental as his power of reasoning, namely, his moral nature. The Categorical Imperative of Kant is not a mere phantom. It stands for something real. Philosophers may differ as to how man became a being with a moral consciousness ; that is, whether it was implanted from the beginning, or whether it was gradually evolved through his social life so that the standard of morality is simply what man finds most useful as a rule of conduct. But whatever may have given rise to this moral consciousness, no one will

deny that the highest interests of man are best conserved by respecting this consciousness and by the practice of making moral distinctions. Even the Utilitarians assert by their very explanation of the origin of man's moral consciousness that the making of distinctions in man's deeds was found *useful* to promote his welfare. When we say "useful to promote man's welfare," we simply assert that the universe is so ordered that it makes a difference as to how we treat it. Our acts are sensible or foolish in so far as they are in harmony or disharmony with the laws of the universe. Our acts, especially in dealing with one another, may be called right or wrong in so far as they are in obedience or disobedience to the laws which best promote man's well being. That is, what we call the moral laws, whose observation makes a difference in man's well being, are not arbitrary laws, but they are natural laws based upon the nature of the universe which we have seen to be rational. Whether, then, man's moral nature was developed through his own discovery that the highest interests of life are best conserved by observing certain laws of conduct, or whether man's moral sense is an inborn sense and, therefore, as ultimate as his power for reasoning ; whichever theory we hold, it seems to come to the same thing. Both positions affirm that there are laws for man's conduct, the

obedience or disobedience of which makes a vital difference. Personally, we think that the Kantian position is the stronger. The norm of the right is inborn as truly as the norm of the rational. It is true that it can be developed by actual experience; but that can also be said of man's power of reason. The latter is no more full fledged and accurate than the former and as it is developed by living in a rational world, the moral nature can be said to be developed by living in a moral world. There is, then, a moral aspect to human life which is fundamental to its highest development.

Now when we examine this moral nature of man, what light does it throw on the problem of immortality? We have already seen in section 4 that it suggests a future by reason of the fact that it is capable of an almost infinite development, that is, it suggests a future life as necessary to realize fully its own capacities. But does it suggest anything further? We have said that the practice of making moral distinctions makes a vital difference in life. We know from experience that in general it is true that "the wages of sin is death," and that "righteousness exalteth a nation." If this does not always come true immediately, all right thinking men agree that it *should* come true sooner or later. We believe instinctively that right should be rewarded and sin punished.

If it is true, then, that experience in general shows that moral distinctions are vital for man's well being and if it is true that mankind, on the whole, believes instinctively, as it were, that goodness should be rewarded and wickedness punished, what do we say to the fact that in life it frequently does happen that the wicked man prospers and the good man often ends his days in suffering and apparent defeat? Injustice in life is often overwhelming. Many a scoundrel has sunny days and many a saint suffers innocently at the hands of his fellow men. The inequalities in life, the partiality, as it were,—what shall we say to these things, if this is a moral universe? We can give no rational answer to these things, if man's present life is all. We know from experience that in general righteousness promotes life and that sin destroys the highest. We believe instinctively that moral distinctions are real and vital. Our moral nature demands fair play in this universe just as emphatically as our rational nature demands a rational outcome. And yet there are these many cases of injustice and unfairness. As we said, there is no rational explanation of these conflicting things, if we treat man's earthly life as complete in itself. There is a rational explanation, if we treat this life as but one chapter of life.

From the earliest ages mankind has felt the difficulty of solving this moral puzzle. The subject of

retribution is as old, apparently, as man himself. In general, we may say there have been two answers. Both agree in saying that this earthly life is but one chapter in life. They differ in that the one explains the present inequalities and apparent injustice primarily by looking to the past; the other, by pointing to the future and telling us to suspend judgment until we know the outcome of the present.

In Oriental philosophy we have the backward look. The inequalities of life, we are told, are due to the sins committed in a former existence. There is in nature that inexorable law of Cause and Effect which is equally operative in man's spiritual life. Man is at any one moment simply what, through his own deeds, he has made himself to be. If the deeds of his present life do not account for his misfortunes, the deeds done in a former existence do. There can be no mistake, for the law of justice is the law of cause and effect. This really amounts to the same thing as saying that whatever is, is just because it is. Now there is a great truth in this answer of Oriental philosophy to the problems of the inequalities in life. The law of cause and effect is a real law in life. To Buddhism's "Jigyo Jitoku" (self do, self get) might be added "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap"; but the weak point in this answer of Oriental philosophy is that the *self* which reaps what it sows is



really not the same self from time to time. And more than this, none of us are conscious of a former existence in which we have committed sins for which we now suffer; and so this answer utterly fails to satisfy our demands for justice. If what seems injustice in life is but the just reward of the sins of a former existence, then I have no more right to help the so-called innocent and down trodden than I have to prevent the laws of governments from punishing the vicious criminal.

Now recognizing the great law of Cause and Effect by the western doctrine of heredity, namely, that a man's entrance into the world is in a measure conditioned by the character of his parents—that he inherits certain tendencies from them,—we cannot admit that he is conditioned by a former responsible existence of his own, for none of us, as we said above, have the slightest consciousness of such an existence, and there is, therefore, no evidence in its favor. We must look forward, then, rather than backwards to explain the inequalities and injustice in life. “What a man soweth that shall he also reap,” looks to the future. And this forward-look to explain the present is really in harmony with the modern method of interpreting the universe. The universe is no longer looked upon by modern scholars as a thing accomplished. It is rather a thing in the becoming. Though in the

material realm we have, apparently, a closed order so that all change is merely a change in place ; it is not so in the spiritual realm. The thought world, the spiritual world is not static. Here there is ever an actual increase or decrease. That is, this universe of ours is, on its spiritual side, at least, a thing in the becoming. Since this is so, it is rational to look to the future for an interpretation of the present.

This life's inequalities and injustice, then, do not disturb us if there is a life where they will be straightened out. That they be straightened out is the demand of our moral nature. To straighten them out by accounting for them on the ground that they are the results of our own deeds done in a former existence, does not satisfy us because we have not the slightest knowledge of such an existence. To straighten them out in a future life would not only satisfy the demand of our moral nature, but it would be the most rational way to do it ; for, as we have said, the universe is, as far as we know it on its spiritual side, a thing in the becoming.

Man's moral nature, then, points to a life to come. Kant's Catagorical Imperative, which to him and to many of us is as fundamental as our power of reason, makes a belief in a future life, not only reasonable, but almost imperative.

## NOTE TO CHAPTER II.

There is a feeling among some scientists to-day that the problem of immortality, if it is ever to be solved satisfactorily, must be solved in some other way than by such philosophic speculations as we have indulged in in this chapter. This other way, they hold, is by the methods of the physical sciences. Accordingly, the Society for Psychical Research has been organized and it is now busying itself with the investigation of all manner of spiritualistic phenomena. Though this society has collected a series of what seem to be rather extraordinary phenomena, there is not as yet a sufficient consensus of opinion as to the correct interpretation of these phenomena to warrant anybody drawing very positive conclusions. It is true that some rather prominent scientists feel that the phenomena collected cannot be explained otherwise than on the ground that they are communications from spirits of the departed. But it is equally true that a much larger number of equally competent scientists consider the whole matter sheer bosh and nonsense; or that if there are these strange phenomena, that they can be adequately explained by attributing them to the mysterious sub-conscious powers of the medium through whom the alleged "communications" are received.

Personally, we think that not much good will come from such investigation, for the simple reason that the spirit world may be quite beyond the field of sense perception. "Even in this world, there is all around us a vast region of possible sights and sounds and other experiences which may be, in some measure open to other creatures, but which is closed to us." And if that is so, how much more likely is it that the spirit world, however real, may be quite beyond the range of any scientist to discover. If then, this society should fail in producing any evidence for the reality of the spirit world, we need not be surprised; and especially need we not surrender the evidence we get through such methods as we employed in this chapter. As far as we can see, the whole movement seems to be fraught with far greater evils than good. It has helped create in some quarters an atmosphere that is very little different from the days of New England witchcraft, and it has opened an easy way for a set of charlatans to prey upon a credulous public. It is not necessary to go back to the days of Saul and the Witch of Endor to get light on this great subject of immortality, but let us rather go forward and in the next chapter see the fuller implications of what we have said in this one.

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### III.

## THE ULTIMATE AS PERSONAL AND TWO FURTHER ARGUMENTS FOR IMMORTALITY.

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#### 1. A CONCEPTION OF THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF OUR BEING.

What we have said thus far can be said without making any definite assumption as to what is ultimate in the universe though the points considered go a long way in establishing our conception of it. As we said in our introduction, to know what man really is and what are his needs for the future is to know in a large measure what the Ultimate itself is. Now as the remaining arguments for a belief in immortality which we wish to present are based on a certain conception of the Ultimate, we stop here to state in the barest outlines what seems to us to be the most satisfactory conception of the ultimate source of our being.

We have looked at some of the outstanding facts of man's nature and in doing this certain things must

have become clear. The first of these is that there is a spiritual side to this world of ours which can in no adequate way be expressed in terms of mechanical force. This spiritual side of the universe is such a tremendous reality that it seems to stand for something ultimate. In fact, Philosophy throughout the ages has been more successful in speaking of things in terms of spirit than otherwise; for man must speak of things in terms of himself, and he knows himself through self-consciousness as a spiritual entity. Not only is it clear that the Ultimate must be conceived of in terms of man's spiritual self, but we also saw, especially in Section 5 of Chapter II that this universe seems to be a rational whole. We saw that if there is to be any knowledge, any science, it can only be if the universe is rational, that is, responds to reason. We are not saying that the universe is a reasoning whole, but a rational whole. That is, it exhibits the elements of reason throughout.

Now when we say that the universe is rational, that it responds to reason, what do we really mean? There are those who hold that in saying this we simply mean that we find the universe a rational order and that we can know enough about it for all practical needs, but that all speculation as to why the universe is a rational order, all attempts to find out whether there is some one thing back of it all or in it



all, and to discover what that something is,—this, they say, is an idle waste of time. We are told to stop our inquiry as to the nature of the Ultimate, for that cannot be known. It is the great Unknowable. This simple creed of the Positivists has the ring of practicality about it. But it is on the very face of it a self-contradiction. It is one thing to say that we do not know the nature of the Ultimate, or Kant's "Ding an sich," but to say positively that we *cannot know* it is to affirm that we really must know a great deal about it. It is just as truly a speculation and an affirmation about the nature of the Ultimate to say that we cannot know it as to say that we can. If we think at all, we must have *some* conception of it; and what that conception will be, will be determined by what we think we really do know.

Now the Positivist agrees with us in saying that we really do know, or at least we think we do, that Nature is rational—that it responds to reason. He has as much confidence in this rationality of Nature as we do, for he proceeds to build up the great sciences, which depend for their very existence on this fundamental assumption. This confidence is not shaken by experience; it is only confirmed. If the Positivist does not care to ask the question as to why Nature responds to his reason, he has a perfect right not to do so. But we reserve the right to ask the

question, and as rational creatures we must answer it in what seems the most rational way.

If Nature responds to man's reason, we ask, is it mere accident that it does so? Does it merely happen so? Is it mere chance that things happen in accordance with rational laws that seem universal? It is quite clear that if it is mere chance that things are rational, then there is no reason why to-morrow the whole order may not be reversed and the idiot become the scientist and the scientist the idiot. The confidence of the Positivistic scientist in the rationality of Nature and especially the confidence that it will be so to-morrow has then no justification. For let it be clearly understood that when the scientist speaks of the laws of Nature, he understands these laws to be but a formulation of what takes place in Nature. The scientist's laws of Nature are but descriptive formulae. They are not explanations as to the why of things; neither do they as such imply necessity in the continuance of their operations.

If, then, the scientist is to retain his confidence in the continued rationality of Nature and if it is true that what we call the laws of Nature are but the descriptive formulae of the way things happen but that these formulae do not exhibit necessity, what must be our theory that will reconcile the two? One or the other, apparently, must give way. Either the

scientist must lose his confidence in the continued rationality of Nature and say that it is mere chance that makes Nature rational to-day, or he must introduce into his laws of Nature, which to begin with are but descriptive formulae, the causal idea and say that they are descriptive formulae of what must happen.

There is no doubt as to which of these two he will choose, or rather tacitly assume. It is agreed on all hands that the word chance has no place in the modern thinker's vocabulary. Nature works not by chance, we are told over and over again, but by universal laws which are immutable. Nothing merely happens, but everything follows great laws which are ever the same. So much is this the creed of the modern man that the phrase "the laws of the universe" is written with capital letters to suggest that these laws are ultimate.

Now how is it that these laws of nature, these descriptive formulae which man learns from observation,—how is it, we ask, that they are regarded as ultimates? Man's observations extend over a very limited period of time and an equally limited space, and yet, we believe, that by this limited observation he discovers universal and eternal laws. No one will deny the validity of the scientist's belief in universal laws, and we all agree, too, that this conclusion rests on an assumption. While it is an assumption, it is,

however, a reasonable assumption. But we must not overlook the fact that in this very assumption we have introduced the causal idea, and we have introduced it because it is absolutely necessary to do so, unless we are willing to leave everything to chance, which, however, no sane person is willing to do. So the question of philosophy is not whether there is a sufficient primary source or cause of things, but rather what is the nature of that cause.

The scientist's confidence in the rationality of the universe beyond the limited field of his observation, then, rests on an assumption which is, however, a rational one. The assumption is this: Though he cannot see the necessity of Nature's rational laws, though they are but descriptive formulae of what happens, he must assume that they are not mere chance happenings, but rather the expression of some compelling force which is ultimate. This assumption, we say, is necessary if science is to be at all possible.

The question, then, that remains to be answered is, what is the nature of this compelling force, this Ultimate which assures the continued rationality of Nature?

Let us say at once that in asking this question we do not wish to imply that we think it possible for the human mind to give an exhaustive answer, and the reader will have to be satisfied with but a few main

points. These main points have been more or less clearly recognized in one form or another by the great thinkers of all ages; and it is in a synthesis of these main points that we think the truth lies. In fact, two terms as used in modern philosophy exhibit these main points. These two terms are Reason and Will.

We started out in this chapter by saying that this universe of ours is a rational universe. We said that this is the creed of all science and without it knowledge would be impossible. It is not a rationality that we read into the universe, but it is there fundamentally. Neither do we find the Universe rational only in parts, but wherever we touch it "Reason oozes out at every pore." This is the creed of creeds and the intelligent man to-day more than ever has "a broader and more luminous conception of the universe as exsisting in some all pervasive Intelligence"—or Reason. Or in the words of another, "The persistent reasoner can travel along paths of strictly scientific thought towards a higher and clearer faith in the one omnipotent mind in which alone the universe, as an ordered and reasonable whole, can find its ultimate explanation." Even those who hold to a mechanical interpretation of the universe, recognize the necessity of positing behind the mechanism a rational source as the sufficient cause of this wonderful mechanism. Weisman, for example, after stating

the necessity of holding the mechanical theory of the universe, says : "I nevertheless believe that there is no occasion for this reason to renounce the existence of or to disown a directive power ; only we must not imagine this to interfere directly with the mechanism of the universe but to be rather behind this latter as the final cause of the mechanism." Of this final cause, he says in another place that we can know one thing, namely, "that it is teleological," that is, rational.

One thing, then, seems certain about this Ultimate, namely, that it is rational. It is Reason. But is this all we can say about it? We said above that the rational laws of nature cannot as such stand for the Ultimate, but that they are rather they expression of a compelling force. That is, they not only exhibit the universe as rational, but also as the expression of effort or force. Now force that is ultimate, that is a force that is not the result of a previous force, must be an eternal and free force. When we look around in this world for such a free force, the nearest thing known in experience is the force man knows himself to be as a willing being. It was left for modern thinkers to emphasize this aspect of the Ultimate, and since the days of Schopenhauer the conception of the universe as the expression of Will is common. It is quite natural, and perhaps even necessary that this



conception of the world as Will should be over emphasized. With some thinkers the term Will seems to stand for little more than blind force, and the conception of the Ultimate as Intelligence or Reason is overlooked. But from what we have said, it is quite obvious that Will used in the sense of mere force is wholly inadequate. If the term Will or Force is to stand for the Ultimate, we must at least conceive of it as an intelligent or rational force. Blind force the Ultimate cannot be, for there is too much evidence in the operation of this force that it is rational. Yes, more, there is not simply evidence that it is rational, but that it is teleological in its operation. Now, teleological means that this force or Will is working with a purpose, and this means a consciousness of what is being done.

To speak of the Ultimate, then, simply in terms of Will is inadequate; especially so when Will is used in the sense of mere force. Or to speak of the Ultimate simply in terms of Reason is also inadequate, as this is likely to ignore too much the struggle and activity that is so universal. To combine the two will yield the more satisfactory conception. We have, then, the Ultimate either as a rational Will, or as a willing Reason, or a willing Intelligence.

But what is a rational Will, or a willing Reason? Is there any one term that will combine the two and conserve what is true in each? The most satisfactory

conception that we can form is represented by the term Personality. The Ultimate conceived of in terms of a personal being will conserve what modern philosophy holds to be its real nature. We do not say that the term Personality exhausts the real nature of that Ultimate Being or Cause, but we do claim that it is the highest and most adequate term we can apply. That the Ultimate may be more than what the term Personality conveys is quite true ; but it is equally true that it cannot be less. It is not a choice, then, between personality and something lower than personality, but between personality and something higher. But as long as we cannot conceive of anything higher than personality, it is obvious that the term is the best we can use.

Frequently it is held that personality implies limitation and, therefore, the Ultimate cannot be personal. But what is the essence of personality? Is it not Reason and Will? Not that personality is a compound of two ultimates, Reason and Will, but that these two terms exhibit two aspects of personality. Mere Reason without the ability to will and do would be limitation. Mere Will without being able to know what is willed or to see the effect of willing would be limitation. But Reason able to will is not limitation. I, as a personal being, am not limited because I think and will. I am limited in my thinking and willing,

but not because of this power. Personality, then, does not necessarily imply limitation. Of course, we can form no clear conception of an unlimited personality ; but neither can we form a very clear conception of what unlimited Will, or unlimited Reason, or unlimited anything would mean. We repeat, the term personality conserves what is essential in the conception of the Ultimate as Will and the Ultimate as Reason. We hold it because it is the highest conception we can form and the only one that is at all adequate to explain facts as they are ; especially the nature of our own spiritual self.

There is one more factor besides Reason and Will which should be added as representing an aspect of the nature of the Ultimate Cause and that is what we know in ourselves as Conscience. The universe is not merely the expression of Reason which is ever active, ever willing, but it also seems to be the expression of a being that is using rational means to accomplish *good ends*. Human life on its spiritual side, with all its longings for the good and aspirations to attain moral ideals, reveals to us this third aspect of the Ultimate which is perhaps not so clearly seen in the rest of Nature. If the starry heavens show the Ultimate as Reason, the heart of man shows it as Conscience. This has been recognized by the great minds of the ages, and we have Plato, Kant and

Fichte pointing to the "Moral Ideal" as representing the Ultimate as truly as it is represented by the Rational and the Struggling or Willing in life. The Ultimate, then, as a Personal Good Being seems to be the conclusion reached by a synthesis of the best in the systems of the world's greatest minds. Weber, in his closing chapter on the History of Philosophy, summing up the tendency of European philosophy says that there are three main factors that are coming together. These factors are what we have given above, namely "reason, which postulates the essential unity of things (Parmenides, Plotinus, Spinoza), experience, which reveals the universality of struggle, effort, will (Heraclitus, Leibnitz, Schelling), and conscience, which affirms the moral ideal, the ultimate end of the creative effort and universal becoming (Plato, Kant, Fichte). Nature is an evolution, of which infinite Perfection is both the motive force and the highest goal (Aristotle, Descartes, Hegel)."

Reason, Will, Conscience—how better shall we combine them than in the conception of a Personal Being working for the Good? And such a Being is what we mean by God,—the Personal God whom we know, not simply by philosophic speculation, but by experience as the Heavenly Father, who cares for his creation and who is in fellowship with man who alone of all creation is made in his own image.

To the philosophic speculation that ends in the conclusion that the Ultimate must be conceived of in terms of Reason, Will and Conscience, that is, in terms of Personality, might be added the argument from experience as it is revealed in the history of religious life. Of course, it is primarily in the Christian Religion that the Ultimate is known as a Personal God,—the Creator of heaven and earth and the Heavenly Father—but all religions bear glowing testimony to the fact of the existence of God. The study of comparative religion, if it has revealed anything, has pointed out that man is “Incurably religious,” and that he is not satisfied until he feels himself in harmony with his God. The out and out atheist is hard to find. Man must believe in some sort of a God. This is recognized by all who are at all familiar with modern investigation along these lines.

The only question open to discussion in the field of comparative religion is as to what conception of God man has found most satisfactory to meet his deepest needs. Without question as man has advanced, his religion has become more and more monotheistic. Even in polytheistic religions there is a strong undercurrent of Monotheism. The gods are after all but various aspects of the one God. But what shall be the conception of this one God, this monotheistic

God that will satisfy man? That and that alone is the real question for the religious man. Shall it be that of a barren Monism which ultimately blots out all distinctions which are vital, and which reduces everything to a dead level,—a God who is but the same as the sum total of the natural world? Or shall it be a conception that really satisfies man's practical needs, namely, a God who though imminent in nature is more than nature as such and transcends nature? The religious man demands as a practical necessity a God of very much the same nature as philosophic speculation reveals the Ultimate to be, namely, what we call a Personal God, a Being with whom man can be in fellowship and conscious communion without thereby losing his own personal identity. So great is this need of man that even those who deny the existence of such a God, nevertheless hold that the idea is practical for conserving the highest interests of mankind. It is at least an idea that works, as the Pragmatists would put it. And to say that a belief in a Personal God is an idea that works, does not merely mean that it satisfies some of our needs, but that it enables us to lay hold on reality in such a way as to bring us to an ever widening and deepening experience. It is a key that unlocks for the religious man the many doors through which he must pass if he would advance. It



is the key that will unlock most satisfactorily the meaning of existence.

As we are now speaking from the standpoint of experience, to experience alone we must appeal to make good our claim ; not so much to the experience of the individual who may read these pages, but rather to the experience of the race. Is it not true that the nations who have held most clearly and firmly the belief in the existence of a Personal God, whose offspring man is and to whom he is responsible, are the ones that have most successfully entered the path of an expanding and deepening life? On the other hand, take the lands where a belief in a Personal God has not been prominent. Take, for example, the lands where Pantheism has prevailed as the dominant religion. Fortunately no nation has ever adopted Pantheism so thoroughly as to carry it to its logical conclusion, but even where it has been tried only partially, it has had a deadening effect on life. It cannot be otherwise, for in the last analysis Pantheism blots out all real distinctions,—both physical and moral,—all personal responsibility, and so cuts the nerve of all progress. As we said in our introduction, it is the deadening effect of Pantheism that has made most Oriental nations so non-progressive. Japan, least Pantheistic of the kingdoms of the East, is most progressive. And in Japan itself the Buddhist sects

which have been most progressive and leaders in civilization have been those which come nearest to a belief in the existence of a Personal God and of a personal immortality.

And if the older Pantheism has had a deadening effect on life, modern Naturalistic Monism, the Newer Pantheism, which makes God simply the same as the sum total of nature, would have an equally paralyzing influence on human progress. It will never be tested as the old Pantheistic philosophy has been tested and found wanting, for its chief advocates are so thoroughly surrounded by a theistic atmosphere that they will never carry into practical conduct the real logic of their creed. The God of the Naturalistic Monist may satisfy the idle speculator, but he can never satisfy the man who is in actual touch with the real problems of human life. The man who knows the deepest needs of the human heart must know that only a Personal God, who cares for man and with whom man can come into personal fellowship, can truly satisfy. From the standpoint of religious experience, then, it is safe to say that for the educated man who is in touch with practical life,—life where distinctions are vital—religion must be practical, too. It must meet man's daily and deepest needs. To do this, we maintain, it must have as one of its fundamental factors a conception of God as a Personal

Good Being. After Theistic Monism, that is, true Monotheism, it is this or nothing. Those who have learned to know God as a Personal Being who cares for man will never be satisfied with a God less than that.

To sum up then. A synthesis of what is best in the great systems of philosophic speculation reveals the Ultimate as a Rational Being, willing and working for good ends. The climax of man's experience as a religious being demands for his deepest satisfaction the existence of a Personal God who cares for him and with whom he can be in conscious fellowship. Philosophy's last word is the Ultimate conceived of in terms of man's spiritual self; religion's last word is God as the Heavenly Father.

The belief in the existence of a Personal God rests, then, on both a broad and deep philosophic speculation, as well as on the deepest experience of man as a religious being. This being so, we proceed in the next section with our main subject, taking for granted as we proceeded the existence of a Personal God.

## 2. ARGUMENTS WHICH ASSUME THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSONAL GOD.

It must be obvious at once that the arguments for immortality which we have already presented could be repeated here with greater force. Take, for ex-

ample, the argument from reason in nature. If this Reason is the expression of a Personal God, which we have just seen it must be, then all the more must we believe that man, the crown of this Reason's activity, must be immortal; for now there appears a new reason for his immortality, namely, that he should be taken into fellowship with the Being in whose image he has been formed. With a Personal God back of things man's existence finds a rational explanation and his immortality becomes a moral certainty. The moral argument, too, has new weight. If the laws of the universe are the expression of the will of God, then our moral consciousness finds an adequate explanation, and we may well trust our instinctive feeling that righteousness must triumph, that good must be rewarded and evil punished. Or again, the argument from earth's limitations and imperfection and the capacity of man's spiritual self for almost infinite perfection, takes on a deeper meaning. With a Personal God ruling the affairs of life, it would seem all the more reasonable that the man who hungers and thirsts for righteousness and truth should find opportunity for a satisfaction of his higher cravings and longings which he cannot realize during this brief earth life.

And so we might go on reviewing the arguments we have already presented and show their fuller

significance when based on the theistic conception of the Ultimate. But are there any new arguments for immortality that have not been presented in the foregoing pages and that grow directly out of the theistic conception of the universe? There are several, but we limit ourselves to two. These two are (A) The Argument from the Axiom of Religion and (B) The Argument from the Resurrection of Christ.

#### A. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE AXIOM OF RELIGION.

Religion according to Professor Hoeffding is "the feeling of the reality and permanence of all we most value." The axiom of religion, he says, is "the conservation of values." It is quite true that this definition of religion is not absolutely adequate from every standpoint; but what definition is? The definition, however, does strike at the very fundamentals of religion when viewed from the standpoint of its intellectual content. Certainly the belief in the "conservation of values" is at the heart of all our religious hopes and beliefs. The axiom meets our deepest need "since this need consists in the desire to hold fast to the conservation of the highest values beyond the limits which experience exhibits and in spite of all the transformations which experience reveals."

Even if it cannot be shown historically that all forms of religion have this belief in the conservation of values as an underlying conviction, it still remains true that it is one of the fundamental convictions of the human race. It is just as immediate as the conviction concerning the logical consistency of the world. This latter conviction, that is, this conviction of the unity of existence is the ideal assumption of all philosophy and science. Philosophy has always assumed that the universe is rational and can be comprehended into a unity, and almost all philosophical systems are but attempts to show this unity. However often men have failed in showing this unity of the cosmos, the demand of the mind for unity is as imperious as ever. So it is with this fundamental conviction of the conservation of values, and we might say that the different religions are attempts to show *what* values abide and *why* they abide. Experience, of course, often tends to upset our belief in the permanency of the valuable, but no more so than does experience apparently often run counter to the conviction of the logical consistency of the world. If we are to trust the latter, we have no reason not to trust the former. It may be impossible for religion to demonstrate beyond a doubt that the valuable abides beyond the limits of experience, but so is it equally impossible for science to demonstrate the operation of



its laws beyond the narrow limits of its observation. If the philosopher has a right to believe in the logical consistency of the universe and if the scientist has a right to believe in the universality and eternity of the laws of the physical world, the man of religion has an equal right to trust his instinctive feeling which tells him that the higher values of life must abide "beyond the narrow limits which experience exhibits and in spite of all the transformations which experience reveals."

Thus far the argument for the axiom of religion holds good even independently of the assumption of the existence of a Personal God, and this much of the argument might well have been given in Chapter II. If we now take for granted the existence of a Personal God, then the belief in the "conservation of values" truly becomes axiomatic. This is so obvious to the modern mind that the belief in a Personal God and in personal immortality are practically inseparable. The one almost necessarily follows from the other, so that when we showed in the last section that the most rational conception of the Ultimate is that the Ultimate is a Rational, Willing Being working for *good ends*, we thereby practically showed that personal immortality, of at least those who are in harmony with God, is a necessity. "He who regards man as the consummate fruition of creative energy and the chief object of

Divine Care, is almost irresistibly driven to the belief that the soul's career is not completed with the present life upon earth."

We say this is obvious to the modern mind. It has not always been so. This will be seen when one examines the history of the idea of personal immortality as it gradually emerged from the world's great monotheistic religion. In the Old Testament, for example, it would seem that the idea of a personal immortality is kept very much in the background, though almost every page proclaims the belief in the existence of "the only true and living God." "I am God and there is none beside me," sums up in a sentence what every seer and prophet preached incessantly. But as to a firm belief in personal immortality one has to look more closely to find it. It is there, however, and like a star here and there on a cloudy night suddenly flashes forth its light, so this great hope of the human race from time to time comes to view to even a casual reader of these Old Testament pages. To a more serious Student it becomes evident that as the Old Testament saints reflected on the relation of the "only true God" to man, they found more and more that it was a relation of fellowship which cannot be broken even by death,—a relationship of "Love stronger than death." They came to the conviction that the valuable must abide

because God is God. Though the masses regarded temporal prosperity as a sign of God's favor and as his greatest gift, there were those who could see beyond that and who, though experience brought only loss, knew that fellowship with God beyond the grave would be their lot. This we have brought before us most dramatically in the great Old Testament drama, the Book of Job. Job almost sinks into despair, for everything has been against him. One thing, however, he remembers and that is sufficient. He remembers that God is God and because God is what he is, he cannot forsake Job. "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and at last he will stand up upon the earth ; and after my skin, even this body, is destroyed, then without my flesh shall I see God ; whom I, even I, shall see on my side, and mine eyes shall behold and not as a stranger." All values had apparently been lost. Even his body, Job knew to be fit only for the dust whence it came. But one thing could not be lost, the highest value would abide, namely, his life of fellowship, of conscious communion with God. This Job believed because he knew the "only true and living God."

When we come to the New Testament, we have this same argument for personal immortality ; only here it is stated with clear and not uncertain notes. In fact, here it appears as an axiomatic truth which

follows from a belief in a Personal God. This argument runs all through the New Testament pages. It is not always given in the form of an argument, but rather as a truth that may be taken for granted. In one place, however, it is given by Christ as an argument, namely, when he was dealing with the Sadducees, who though they did not deny the existence of the God of their fathers, nevertheless, denied personal immortality. Christ says to them "That the dead are raised even Moses showed, in the place concerning the Bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham and the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob. Now he is not a God of the dead but of the living: for all live unto him." For the Sadducees to admit the existence of God, Christ held, made it absurd to deny personal immortality. Of course, Christ does not give here any argument for the existence of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, for that was to him also self evident. Then besides, *that* was not questioned by his questioners. For Christ to have advanced arguments for the existence of his Heavenly Father would have been rather out of place. His life was the strongest possible demonstration of the reality of the spiritual world and of the existence of his Father, to do whose will was Christ's very meat and drink. He who said, "Blessed are the pure in heart for they shall see God" demonstrated by his own

purity of life the existence of God whom he constantly beheld and whom Christ's followers may behold. After all, what makes the spiritual world more real and what makes the existence of God and the truth of a personal immortality more self evident than the life of a pure and upright man? It is when we see Christ in the purity and beauty of life, it is when we see sordid humanity transformed into the nobility of a good character by the power of Christ's life,—it is at such a time that we see most clearly Him whom to know is life eternal.

Now Christ's argument for immortality was also the argument of his greatest disciples. Paul, for example, in the midst of conflict and apparent defeat wrote to the Romans of his faith in the "conservation of values," because through Christ he had learned to know the goodness of God. "If God is for us who is against us?" he exclaims. And again after surveying his own sufferings for the truth he says: "Nay in all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved us. For I am persuaded, that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor death, nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." He knew that if anything is to abide the wreck of time, it is what

he had experienced to be the essence of God, namely, Love and its promises. "Love never faileth," for "Love is stronger than death." Since God is what he had experienced him to be as he learned to know him through Jesus Christ, Paul could say with sincerity and without a tremor "To die is gain," for then he would see "face to face."

The argument of Christ and of his greatest disciple has always been the most convincing argument to all the thousands and millions who during these nineteen hundred years have learned to know God as the Heavenly Father, who cares for his children. Millions since the days of Christ in the flesh have agreed with the men of that generation that "He spake as one having authority." They have tested the truth of his words in regard to our present life which we experience from day to day, and these millions are justified in relying on his words when he speaks of the permanence of these values beyond the limits of our present experience. They are justified in believing him when he says, "because I live ye shall live also."

This axiom of religion, namely, this belief in the conservation of the highest values is, like all axioms, self evident when once understood. As religion is not mere theory but real experience, real life, we dare not ignore the testimony of the myriads who say that they know and know from experience that values are



real, that "God is and is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him."

Even theoretically, as we have shown above, are the facts of the world about us best accounted for on the ground of the existence of a Personal Being, who is back of all and works in all. When to this we add the experience of the millions which speaks even more emphatically for the existence of such a being, then surely we are justified in believing, yes, it seems we must believe, that in spite of the constant change and seeming disappearance of what we call most valuable, — surely we must believe that the highest values will abide.

#### B. ARGUMENT FROM THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST.

The thoughts presented in the last section bring us to a point where a new and final objection to a belief in immortality might be raised. It is an objection that many make. Logically it can be made only by those who believe in the theistic God, and that is why we did not present the objection in Chapter I, where we dealt with objections. In short the objection is as follows: If man is immortal, why has not some one appeared from the dead to tell us positively? We might reply, Why should any one tell us? Perhaps

the existence beyond the grave, though conscious and personal, is of such a nature that we could not apprehend it even if we were in the presence of such an existence. In fact, the spiritual self of man is never visible or tangible as such. We apprehend but the body with our senses. The smile of love and the frown of anger are understood only by inference. What the eye actually sees is but the wrinkle on the face and the contraction of the brow. These things as such are not love and anger. If even now the spiritual self is really hidden from our sense perception, it need not seem strange if the disembodied spiritual self of the departed is not apprehended by our senses. In fact, our senses fail to apprehend even many things that the senses of other animals apprehend. They also fail utterly to perceive realities whose existence we are compelled to posit. The ether, for example, is such a reality. Science seems compelled to assume its existence and yet none of us apprehend it with our senses directly. Quite true replies the objector, but if there is such a God as Theism holds, a God who cares for man, then surely it would be possible and reasonable for him to send one back from the dead and so demonstrate to doubting humanity that death is not the last word, but that love is stronger than death. We admit that the objection stated in this form is reasonable. If there

is a good and loving God in control of this world of ours and if he has made man for a life to come, then it does seem rather reasonable to expect that God should, if possible, give us a demonstration of his power to save from death.

This reasonable expectation, the Christian believes, has been met by the Resurrection of Christ. The great Christian Church has always held and holds to-day, as one of its cardinal doctrines, the Resurrection of Jesus as a demonstration of God's power over death itself. And when we say this, we do not forget that we are speaking of a matter that is hard for the modern mind to accept, for clearly we are dealing with something extraordinary and miraculous, and the modern mind is strongly averse to the miraculous.

Now we do not expect to go into all the arguments for the possibility of miracles in general and the miracle of the Resurrection in particular. We shall deal only with what to us seem the main points. And in the first place, we should like to call attention to the fact that the objection to a belief in immortality on the ground that God has not raised one from the dead and so demonstrated his power over death—this objection, we hold, implies not only the possibility of the miracle of the Resurrection, but it demands this very miracle as a necessity to vindicate the goodness and wisdom of God. The one, then,

who makes the above objection to immortality manifestly cannot refuse to believe in the Resurrection of Christ on the ground that it involves the miraculous. The only ground on which he can reasonably refuse to believe in the Resurrection is on the ground that there is not enough historical evidence to justify belief. He admits not only the *possibility*, but even the *probability* of such an event as the Resurrection of Jesus. Is there enough historical evidence to make this probability a moral certainty? That is the question involved here.

Now by historical evidence we do not mean merely whether there are enough reliable records of that event that can be shown to date exactly from such and such a time. Since it was an event from which have grown such tremendous consequences as are exhibited by the whole history of the Christian church, its reality must be judged primarily from the standpoint of these consequences. That is, it must be regarded not merely as an alleged event recorded in certain more or less authentic writings, but it must be regarded as a creative event and, therefore, its reality must be judged by what it has created as well as by the reliability of the witnesses that record the event itself. It is, then, a question of historical evidence in the deepest and fullest sense, namely, historical evidence extending down to the present time.

To come to this question, then, with a fair mind we must come to it as we would to any alleged historical event and not approach it with *a priori* demand for some other kind of evidence than is demanded for other historical events. If there is any prejudice one way or the other, it should be in favor of the probability of such an event. This is the case if one takes the theistic theory of the universe for granted and if one is considering the subject from the standpoint occupied by the objection to immortality with which we are dealing in this section. We admit that to establish an alleged miraculous and unique event independently of any philosophical presupposition would require more accurate and reliable evidence than is required for events that are ordinary, but in this case we assume certain philosophical presuppositions, namely, the theistic theory of the universe, which makes such an event not only possible, but, as the above objection to a belief in immortality implies, divinely probable. Even Humes' severe test of the miraculous, we think, can be met in the case of the miracle of Christ's Resurrection.

To come, then, at once to the main point of the historical evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus. The first point is this that no one questions to-day "that the Christian Church was founded on, or in connection with, an energetic preaching of the Lord's Resurrection

from the dead. The fact may be questioned; the *belief* will be admitted." In support of this critics of the most radical type can be quoted. The real problem, then, is to find what it was that gave rise to the *belief* of the disciples and the early church in the Resurrection. We cannot doubt that the disciples of Christ believed that their Lord whom the Jews had crucified had risen from the dead. *Why* did they believe this?

This belief in the Resurrection of their Lord will be found to rest on what was to them and to the Apostolic Church two indubitable facts, namely, (1) the fact that the tomb where they had buried Jesus was empty after the third day and (2) the fact that Jesus afterwards appeared to the disciples and brethren a number of times and in different places. Though the records of these two points show slight differences here and there, it is, nevertheless, the consensus of opinion among modern scholars that the disciples and the early church believed essentially these two things and their Resurrection *faith* rested on them as the two great pillars. It is admitted on all hands that we have good historical evidence that the disciples and the Apostolic Church believed in the Resurrection of Jesus and that their belief rested on what seemed to them sufficient evidence.

The real point at stake, then, is whether the



disciples and Apostolic Church correctly interpreted the facts in connection with the death and alleged Resurrection of Jesus. Did they really see and hear what they thought they did, or can we account for their belief in the Resurrection of Jesus by some other way than by an actual rising from the dead and an actual appearing to them?

In trying to account for the Resurrection Faith in some other way than by granting that Jesus actually rose from the dead and appeared to his disciples, different theories have been advanced. These theories, though differing in many ways, can practically all be put into two main groups. The first group is constituted by those which make belief in the *empty tomb* the center of attack, while the second group is made up of those theories which see in the *appearances of the risen Jesus* the main point to be explained. Of course, none of them can stop with only one or the other of these two main points. If the *empty tomb*, for example, is considered the main pillar of the Resurrection Faith, it is not enough to demolish this alone and leave the appearances of the Risen Lord untouched. The theory must also account for the second pillar. So while we make two groups of the theories they all must account for both pillars on which the Resurrection Faith rests.

The one advantage these theories have over the orthodox theory is that they offer a more or less naturalistic interpretation of what purports to be a supernatural event. This advantage is due to the attitude of mind so common to-day, namely that any explanation, however absurd, is preferable to an interpretation which involves the miraculous however reasonable. But let us be reminded again that the objection to the belief in immortality on the ground that no one has appeared from the dead implies not only the possibility, but the divine probability of a miracle. And let us also be reminded that it is only a common place to say that no competent thinker of today excludes the possibility of the miraculous. Of course, the old view that a miracle is a violation of the laws of the universe would make it hard for the modern man to believe in the possibility of a miracle. But when the laws of the universe are recognized to be the expression of an intelligent, willing being, it is absurd to hold that this being is not able to do what transcends our experience and understanding. After all, Science really does not understand its most ordinary laws. As we said in another section, Science's laws are but formulae of what happens, and not explanations of how and why things happen as they do. The laws of Science do not exhibit the necessity of things. Even such a common thing as

gravitation cannot be shown to be necessary. Who, then, will say that a miracle, a something that transcends our ordinary experience, does not and cannot take place? Such a position is nothing short of being preposterous. When, then, theories of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ are advanced, they must really account for the facts in the case. It is not enough that they are naturalistic in their explanation.

But to state very briefly the leading theories that have been advanced, and first those that start with the *empty tomb* as the main foundation of the Resurrection Faith.

There is first the "Fraud Theory" of Reimarus which held that the tomb was empty because the disciples came and stole the body and so deceived the people by saying that Jesus rose from the dead. It is enough to say that no one holds this theory to-day, for everybody admits that the disciples would not have suffered death to perpetuate a lie.

Recent variations of this theory fare little better. For example, the theory that Pilate or the enemies of Jesus took away the body. They would have all the reason in the world to produce the dead body, rather than hide it, to discredit the preaching of the disciples.

Some one has advanced the theory that Joseph of Arimathaea, a friend of Jesus, took away the body and let the disciples think he rose from the dead.

This, too, is so absurd that practically no one holds it.

Then there is the theory that the women went to the wrong tomb by mistake and finding it empty, immediately proclaimed the resurrection of Jesus. This, too, is absurd on the face of it. For it would have been the simplest thing in the world for the enemies of Jesus, who knew where Jesus was buried, to go to the right tomb and produce the body.

Of much the same nature are practically all the theories that start with the *empty tomb* as the main point to be explained. It is safe to say that none of them have ever had or will have a large following. The naturalistic theories that have had most advocates are those that begin with the belief in *the appearances of the Risen Lord* as the main point to be accounted for, and that make the faith in the *empty tomb* depend on this or, what is more frequently the case, ignore the faith in the *empty tomb*.

Let us come, then, to the second group of theories. They, one and all, explain the belief in *the appearances of the Risen Lord* on the ground of visions. The older form of these theories made the visions mere subjective hallucinations. True enough, subjective hallucinations have been common in all ages, but it is equally true that no one can read the sober account of the appearances of Jesus and find in them the slightest traces of that excitement and expectancy on the

part of the disciples that would be psychologically necessary for such hallucinations. The disciples were soberminded men and they did not expect the resurrection of their Lord. In fact, they thought all was over when Jesus died and they were getting ready to return to their former occupations because they thought their cause was lost. As Professor Orr says: "Psychologically, no good cause has ever been shown why the disciples should have this marvellous outburst of visionary experience; should have it so early as the third day, should have it simultaneously, should have it within a strictly limited period, after which the visions as suddenly ceased, should never afterwards waver about it, should be inspired by it for the noblest work ever done on earth. If anything is certain historically, it is that the death of their Master plunged the disciples into the deepest despondency, that their hearts, always 'slow to believe,' were sad, and their hopes broken, and that so far from expecting a Resurrection, they could hardly be persuaded of the fact even after it occurred."

If psychologically it is impossible to account for such visions, it is even more difficult to account for the *outcome* of the belief in the Resurrection. No one has spoken more emphatically on this point than Keim whose view is summed up by Godet as follows: "It would be difficult to understand how from a society

held together by over-excitement issuing in visions could have proceeded the Christian Church, with its lucidity of thought and earnestness of moral activity."

Then there is this further obstacle to the vision theories that the disciples also believed in the *empty tomb*. If they preached the Resurrection, it would have been an easy thing for the enemies of Jesus to produce the body of Christ and so silence all such preaching. But instead of that we find these cowardly disciples proclaim openly in the face of friend and foe alike their faith in the Risen Lord.

There are those who recognizing the difficulties of the subjective hallucination theories, nevertheless hold to visional theories, that is, they hold that the Spiritual Jesus actually did appear to the disciples, and some even go so far as to say that the disciples had *objective* visions of the Spiritual Christ, though the body of Jesus never as such rose from the dead. It is enough to say that such theories involve the supernatural and miraculous as truly as does the orthodox theory, and they have the added difficulty of accounting for the belief in the *empty tomb*.

Since the advent of the study of Comparative religion and especially the study of Babylonian religious beliefs, efforts have been made to reduce the whole affair about Jesus Christ to mere myths. Other religions, they say, have myths about heroes



rising from the dead, therefore, this, too, is but a rejuvenated myth. Such theories, it is self evident, create more psychological difficulties than they can hope to solve. For the question at once arises, why should a group of fishermen suddenly lay hold on a mere myth and connecting it with Jesus of Nazareth go everywhere proclaiming the Resurrection of Jesus Christ? The very fact that such myths have been common would make it a psychological miracle to have men do what the disciples did,—give their lives for their faith in the Resurrection of Jesus.

If the antecedents of the faith in the Resurrection are reduced to a myth, we ask, How can we account for the results that flowed from this Resurrection? For results there have been and still are. The life and life work of the Apostles is such a result. "Pentecost is such a result. The Apostolic Church is such a result. The conversion of St. Paul, the Epistles of the New Testament, the spirit-filled lives of a multitude of believers are such results. The Church founded on the Apostolic witness has endured for nineteen centuries. Christian experience throughout all these ages is a fact which only a Living Christ can explain or sustain. The Apostle speaks of the 'power' of Christ's Resurrection. That which continuously exerts 'power' is a demonstrable reality." We repeat, no mere myth and no mere subjective

hallucination in the brain of an over-excited set of fools could possibly account for these results.

Practically every theory that has ever been concocted to explain on a naturalistic basis the belief in the Resurrection of Jesus, only creates more difficulties than it solves. So glaring are the deficiencies of these various theories that the advocate of every new one starts out by showing—and usually successfully—the absurdities of the old ones. So much is this the case that one can find no better argument for the orthodox theory than in these naturalistic theories themselves.

It has been said that no event is so well historically attested as the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. Perhaps this is an over statement, if by historical attestation we mean simply the existence of reliable and authentic records whose exact date and authorship we can now determine. But if by historical attestation we mean not merely the existence of such reliable records, but in addition to this a number of great and significant events and a present living reality, all of which flowed from the Resurrection of Jesus—then, we claim the statement is more than true. The Resurrection has in its favor the existence of records by eye witnesses, and records by other men of the same generation. These witnesses, as we can judge from their writings, were men of more than average intelligence. They were men of good common sense, not anxious to

follow "cunningly devised fables," but seekers after truth. They were sincere and had no possible motive for deception, for by proclaiming the Resurrection they lost everything they had—even their own lives. The Resurrection has in its favor a series of historic events that led to the establishment of the great and ever growing Christian church, which has ever had for its foundation and for its perpetual inspiration a belief in this cardinal doctrine of Christianity. Without the *reality* of the Resurrection the church would never have come into existence. Without the stamp of veracity on the records of the Resurrection, and without the living presence of the Risen Christ the Christian Church would never have survived, yes, triumphed over tremendous odds; much less would it be what it is to-day,—an ever growing body, expanding with irresistible force into all parts of the world bringing life, light, and peace unto millions.

Granting, then, that the Resurrection of Christ was what the Christian Church holds it to be, what bearing has this on the doctrine of immortality? It shows that at least one person has survived the power of death and so answers the objection that if God is good, he should send some one back from the beyond and thereby prove that death does not end all. The question will, however, at once arise whether the victory over death by one like Jesus would argue for the

immortality of the average man. It is admitted by practically all who have studied the character of Jesus that he was unique, and this very uniqueness might be sufficient to make him victorious over death, but would not necessarily prove the immortality of the average man. In fact, the modern attitude towards the problem of the Resurrection of Jesus is to prove its probability from the unique character of Jesus as revealed in his life. Quite right. The Resurrection of Jesus by itself would not necessarily prove the immortality of the average man, but the Resurrection of Jesus does not stand by itself. It is the appearance from the dead of One who also lived and taught among men, and we must take it in connection with what he taught. That he taught that there was a future life for man goes without saying. The truthfulness of his teaching on this point we may not be able to demonstrate, but when we see how truthful were his words about the things of our present life which we can experience from day to day, when we see how he spake as "one having authority" about these things, then surely we may trust him in what he tells us about the life beyond; especially since by his rising from the dead he demonstrated his power over death itself and thereby sealed his promises.

The Resurrection of Jesus, then, is above all a demonstration of the power of God over death itself,

and He through whom this power was demonstrated may be trusted to tell the truth when he says: "Because I live ye shall live also" and "Let not your heart be troubled: believe in God, believe also in me. In my Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you; for I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I come again, and will receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also."

Surveying the field, now, which we have covered in this and the preceeding chapters, what are we to say to all these things? Each argument presented speaks for itself, but to get the real force of any one of them we must take them together. A mountain river is a source of joy and strength to the weary traveller, but if it is not joined by other rivulets and streams as it passes on and on, it is likely to be lost; especially when it reaches the wide and dusty plains below. But if it is joined by others, it grows into a torrent and then widens and deepens into a great and mighty river passing through green fields and carrying on its bosom the commerce of a nation. So it is with these arguments for immortality. If there were only one or two arguments and everything else pointed the other way, then, indeed, man's fountain of hope would soon be dried up in the desert of doubt

and despair. But this is not the case as we have seen. It is a mighty river of evidence whose tributaries come from many directions, and he who will but for a moment lift his head above the dust and noise of this life will see that the river flows on to the sea and will hear in its music the songs of angels. On this stream of evidence of man's great hope, we may confidently embark, yes, must embark, if our power of vision is above that of the clam which knows life only in terms of the mud and sand on the river's bank. Yea, more, when on this river of truth we entrust ourselves, we shall sooner or later meet the Pilot who will see that our bark is not wrecked on some hidden rock.

Belief in immortality, then, is supported by a number of independent arguments and these, when taken together, make the evidence so strong that it seems to us almost irrational to deny the possibility or even the probability of life beyond the grave. And when to these general reasons we add the experience of those who have come into personal contact with Him who "brought life and immortality to light," it seems nothing short of folly to hold that the destiny of man is in the grave.

The philosophies of educated races have established the sublime probability that there is a future life. Christianity has made this probability a practical certainty by establishing "the consciousness of a



personal relation to one who is akin to us and who has carried our nature in victory over death—the consciousness of a personal relation to a Risen Lord.” The consciousness of the true Christian’s life in Christ is prophetic of its own immortality and he who has this consciousness may sing with Tennyson.

“For though from out our bourne of Time  
and Place

The flood may bear me far,  
I hope to meet my Pilot face to face  
When I have crossed the bar.”

Or in the words of Paul, “I know Him Whom I have believed, and I am persuaded that He is able to guard that which I have committed unto Him against that day.”

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#### IV.

### LIFE ETERNAL.

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Thus far we have used the term Immortality in the sense of a conscious personal existence beyond the grave, but we have said nothing as to whether or not it is the same for all mankind. It goes without saying that a conscious existence may be one of perfect bliss or it may be one of unmitigated torment. It may be Heaven or it may be Hell. That is true in our conscious life upon earth, and it cannot be otherwise beyond the grave.

That there must be a difference in the existence beyond the grave seems as certain as that there will be an existence at all. And it is not strange that wherever a belief in immortality has been held, it has always been held that not all men can possibly share the same fate; at least not immediately upon their entering the realms beyond. The difference, according to the beliefs of all advanced nations is based upon the spiritual condition and moral worth of the individual. The righteous and the wicked, the truly wise and the foolish, shall not share the same fate. This

is almost an axiomatic statement; at least among advanced races is it so. Among the earlier races other elements entered in, such for example, as social position. Yet even there spiritual worth was not altogether ignored.

Reserving for the present the nature of the life of the righteous, let us consider briefly what is to be said about

### THE LOT OF THE WICKED.

Three theories have been advanced which exhaust the possibilities of the case. These three are: (1) The doctrine of final loss and endless separation; (2) The doctrine of restoration; either held absolutely or in a vaguer fashion as the "larger hope"; and (3) The doctrine of total extinction, either immediately after death, or by a gradual fading into nothingness. The first holds that the wicked shall maintain a conscious existence after death, but that it shall be an unhappy one because it is separation from God. It is a conscious existence at variance with what alone can make for true happiness. The second holds that the wicked upon entering the realms beyond shall, to be sure, suffer the consequences of his folly, but that ultimately he shall be restored to fellowship with God. This, it is held, shall be brought about either through his own suffering or through the mercy of God, which cannot permit the final loss of human life however degraded.

The third holds that the wicked shall neither share ultimately the fate of the righteous nor that he shall share the awful fate of an eternal conscious existence of torment, but that he shall not exist at all.

Each one of these three theories has, of course, a number of variations, but what we have given, covers what is essential in each. Three possibilities, then, lie before the wicked: (1) a continued unhappy existence; (2) an existence of unhappiness for a while, but ultimate restoration; (3) total annihilation of all consciousness. It might be profitable to review the arguments for immortality which we have presented with a view of seeing what they indicate as to this problem of the fate of the wicked, but we shall not stop to do this. It is enough to know that even the most hopeful of these three theories, namely the theory of restoration, admits that at least the immediate fate of the wicked is not one to be desired. And we might add that a close study of human character, especially its tendency to become more and more fixed, either in the good or in the evil, makes the chances for the wicked to turn about face in the next world and love righteousness and truth very few indeed. If man now loves evil rather than good, what guarantee have we that in the realms beyond he will prefer righteousness and truth to sin and folly? Man is even now fast becoming what he chooses, and he is likely to continue to choose

what he is. This is more and more true as character becomes fixed. It would seem, then, that the truth about the lot of the wicked beyond the grave lies along more severe lines than what the second theory holds. But we refrain from being dogmatic on this point. It is a difficult problem indeed as is shown by the differences of opinion among Christian believers of all ages. With these few words we dismiss the subject, resting in the assurance that the "Judge of all the earth shall do right."

We turn our thoughts, then, to the other side of immortality, namely, to the life of the righteous and the truly wise. This existence is usually spoken of among Christian thinkers as Life Eternal, Eternal Life, or Life Everlasting, and we shall follow this usage, grouping what we have to say under two final sections, namely; (1) the Nature of Eternal Life; and (2) the Way to Eternal Life.

### THE NATURE OF ETERNAL LIFE.

Thus far we have said that the immortality of the righteous is a conscious personal existence of happiness. It is an Eternal Life. But what more can we say about it?

We need not warn the reader from expecting a very definite picture of this life that is to be. We

cannot be so graphic in depicting its joys as some writers have been, but we can venture a few thoughts which are, after all, quite sufficient. To begin with, if the existence beyond the grave is an Eternal Life, it must be in the very nature of the case a life of endless progress, for progress is a characteristic of life. And if it is an endless progress, we cannot expect to see from this shore more than the beginning of that endless vista. The *beginning*, however, we can see. For again, if it is an Eternal Life for the individual, it is absolutely essential that there be a vital connection between what man is before and what he is after death. There cannot be an absolute break between the two. However much we may have changed from the moment this present life ends, the change cannot be so radical that the consciousness of *sameness* is gone. That is, if we are to have *personal* immortality, if the I of the present is to recognize itself in the future, there must be a persistence and contiguity in what is essential to the nature of the I of the present. This being the case, it is safe to speak of Eternal Life in terms of the present. Indeed, how else could we speak of it? The unknown must always be spoken of in terms of the known.

At this point, however, arises a danger. While it is legitimate to speak of the life beyond in terms of the present, we must guard against simply transferring



the present into the future and making the life beyond but a second edition of our earth life. And the first step in guarding against this danger is to keep clearly before us what man really is. We have seen over and over again that man is above all a rational, willing, feeling being. We have seen that what we call man's body is to be looked upon as a mean's through which the spiritual self operates upon its present physical environment, but that in a new environment this particular kind of instrument may be dispensed with, or that it may be replaced by another that is suited better to the new environment. "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." "If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body." "As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." The meaning is obvious that we should not think of the future life in terms of our bodily life, or if we do so, that it must be in terms of the bodily life only in so far as this latter is an expression of the spiritual self. Many of the activities and interests of our present life may be regarded as symbols of the future life. They may be taken as representing the nature of our existence in the realms beyond, but only in so far as they are the expression of the spiritual self; and it must always be kept in mind that under new conditions and in a new environment the spiritual self may express itself in

other ways. When Christ, then, speaks of Heaven as a "house with many mansions," or when we read of the "city of God," "the new Jerusalem," we are not to think so much of these things as concrete realities, but rather as representing the life of the spiritual self in its fellowship with God and beings similar to itself. To make the next world seem real, we must use symbols to express it, but we must never lose sight of the fact that they are symbols; and especially must we always interpret the symbols, not in terms of the bodily life as such, but in terms of the life of the spirit.

But we can be more specific and perhaps nearer the truth, if instead of speaking by means of general symbols, we speak directly in terms of the spiritual self. We have seen that the world process has produced as its best, human personality, and that the principle of evolution is to go on, working an endless enrichment of human personality. Eternal Life is eternal progress; and the progress is along the lines that represent the three aspects of personality, namely, the intellect, the will and the feelings. Growth in knowledge seems certain. A number of the arguments which we have presented carry with them an argument for growth in knowledge. With growth in knowledge must come a greater freedom in willing; for true freedom consists in knowing the laws of God and

obeying them. And with fuller knowledge which leads to greater freedom, there must come purer feelings, deeper satisfaction. Even here in this life is it possible to enrich our personality, and we are not wrong when we hold that these enrichments or achieved values of the personality are not only conserved in the next world, but that they form the basis for an endless growth along the same lines under conditions more and more favorable.

We think of Heaven, then, as a condition where knowledge shall be made perfect; where our wills shall be brought into perfect harmony with the will of God; and where in consequence of this we shall feel perfectly contented and find perfect happiness. Heaven is perfected knowledge. "This is life eternal, that they might *know* Thee the only true God and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." "Now we see in a mirror darkly; but then face to face: Now I know in part; but then shall I know fully even as also I was fully known." Heaven is a consciousness of an increasing freedom of the will. "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." It is a freedom that comes through the truth; and what is this but the abolishment of sin and all its entanglements and slavery? "Every one that committeth sin is the bondservant of sin.....If therefore the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." "Our

wills are ours we know not how, our wills are ours to make them thine." Where that condition is fulfilled, there is Heaven. And because Heaven is a condition in which we shall know the truth through which we become free, we cannot fail to be conscious of a feeling of perfect satisfaction,—Perfect Peace. It is not the peace of Nirvana which is the result of a ceasing of striving and willing, not a rest that comes through absorption in the Great All ; but a peace that comes through a consciousness of being in harmony with God, a rest that flows from a triumph over all that makes weary, namely, a peace and a rest that flow from a fulness of life. And this fulness of life is one of conscious communion and fellowship with God our Father and with the fellow blessed, the sons of God. "Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he shall dwell with them, and they shall be his peoples, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God : and he shall wipe away every tear from their eyes ; and death shall be no more ; neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain, any more : the first things are passed away. And he that sitteth on the throne said, Behold, I make all things new." "Beloved, now are we the children of God and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be, we know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him ; for we shall see him even as he is."

Now if the life beyond the grave is a development and growth along all the lines of our personality which we call highest and holiest, if beyond the grave the highest values of the present life shall not only be conserved, but shall become the basis for further enrichment of our personality, it might be worth while to consider one more point, namely.

### THE WAY TO LIFE ETERNAL.

From what we have said above, it would seem that Eternal Life is not only a continuance and a growth of all that is highest and holiest in our present life, but that it is also in a large measure conditioned by our present life. Or to put it the other way, Eternal Life has its beginning in this life. Since this is so, the present life is of momentous significance. We are now becoming what we shall be; at least are we fixing in this life the direction, as it were, of our development. There are all shades of differences between men in regard to their actual spiritual attainments, but all men can be divided into two great classes from the viewpoint of the direction in which their heart's desire leads them. The all important thing, then, in our present life is to be going in the right direction. It is not what a man does, nor what he theoretically believes, not even what he is; but what he loves and

sincerely longs to be, that opens up to him the gates of Heaven. The sincere seeker after truth, the earnest promoter of righteousness, the one who with his whole soul identifies himself with what is best and noblest, is in the way of Life Eternal. "And behold a certain lawyer stood up and made trial of him saying, Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? And he (Jesus) said unto him, what is written in the law? how readest thou? And he answering said, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself.' And he said unto him, 'Thou hast answered right; this do and thou shalt live.'" What is this but the complete indentification of one's soul desire with God and his plan. And is not this the only rational basis for an entrance into Life Eternal? Surely if this universe of ours is a rational system, and especially if it is the work of an all wise and good being, who by his power assures its future, we would expect those and *only* those who are in harmony with his laws and who love and long for communion with him to be happy; not so much perhaps as a reward, but rather owing to the very necessity of the case.

But the question arises, what is it to identify one's self with the will of God? How can man know God



and his ways, or how can he know what he should do and be and love, if he would have Life Eternal? There are many ways through which man can have some knowledge of what is best and highest, for in the very heart of man is a light "that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." And those who sincerely follow this light may be sure to see God. And further, God has not left himself without special witnesses among all men through whom he has in an especial way sought to turn the thoughts of men to himself. But there is One who in a unique way has pointed out the way to Life Everlasting. There is One of whom all men who have studied his life say that he was all and more what all right thinking men must love and long to be. There is One of whom his greatest disciple said that he "brought life and immortality to light"; One of whom another great disciple and contemporary said, summing up in pregnant words the real significance of his mission, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish but have eternal life." To believe in Jesus Christ in the sense in which John used the word "believe," is the same as what Christ said to the lawyer it was necessary to do to enter Life Eternal. It is loving God with all one's heart and one's neighbor as one's self; for Jesus Christ revealed the Father by

living the perfect life among men. Believing in Christ, then, with all sincerity and longing is to know God and to enter our high destiny as the true sons of God.

We are not saying that only those who know and believe in the historic Christ shall share the blessedness of an eternal existence in fellowship with God, but certainly there is no other way for those who do know Christ; "for we needs must love the highest, when we see it." To see the higher and choose the lower is to leave the way to Life Eternal.

If we would learn, then, what the Future Life is and what is the way that leads to it, surely we can do no better than to go to Him who said, "I am the way, the truth and the life." For "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast words of Eternal Life!"



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